A few links, Yemen-related

Chris Boucek has a new book out on Yemen: Yemen on the Brink, published by Carnegie.  I think it is a collection of essays (the titles look familiar).  Put this on the "to-read" list, for sure.  Chris' insights and research are always extremely valuable.

Oliver Holmes has a gripping story in Time about the children of Sada'a- they have known war and displacement for 6 years; there is no way that doesn't warp you.  Along with the basic demographic and environmental issues Yemen is facing in the medium-to-long term (and yes, the short) this will only add pressure. It could be noted that if things continue to go poorly in the south you can have a pincer movement of trauma.

This makes twice today I've linked to Time, which I think puts the total times this blog has done so at two. 

Finally, here's a story about what else was potentially foiled in the Hawta battle: a "plot to kill senior military officials and foreign targets".   This is fairly predictable, even if it doesn't fit our usual conception of terrorism.  AQAP will strike at the US or Europe or elsewhere if the opportunity presents itself, but right now it is focused on destabilizing the government through attacks and assassinations.   This is why I think it is useful to look at them as primarily a rebel group with ultimate jihadi goals.  They aren't entirely a rebel group, like say the Houthis, but many of their motives and methods are the same.  It will be interesting to see how it plays out as they more prominent in the jihad community and continue to attract foreign fighters, many of whom won't really care about the immediate Yemeni goals.  I think whether or not the organization can survive will depend on how much influence al-Wuhayshi will be able to impose on his new troops.  If they can keep his vision and patience as a guiding light, they will continue to grow as a threat, perhaps exponentially.  If not, the leadership of AQAP has shown no revulsion at taking out their own- which could provide a fatal distraction.  I am not currently willing to hazard a guess as to which way it will go, but an influx of fighters could provide a way to destabilize the group itself.

This seems like it should be its own post once I get my head around what I am trying to say.  

Scariest read of the day

Shockingly, it isn't about Yemen (yup- I am going to go one post not talking about Yemen).  Barton Gellman in Time has an up-close and well-reported look at extreme right-wing militias, many of whom think war against the government is both inevitable and desirable.  It is unsettling- you want to think of these guys as toothless (literally and figuratively), but they have weapons, oftentimes a feverish religiosity, and a deep-seated conviction that the government is illegitimate and that they are the representatives of the people's will. 

OK, maybe this is about Yemen.   The parallels with AQAP are pretty striking, anyway. 

Here's a money quote, and a perfect example of cold-blooded sociopathy wrapped in a bogus cloak of Constitutionalism. 

Regardless of what conscience tells them, what chance do would-be armed rebels possibly have of prevailing against the armed might of the U.S.?
One answer comes from former Alabama militia leader Mike Vanderboegh, who wrote an essay that is among the most widely republished on antigovernment extremist sites today. In "What Good Is a Handgun Against an Army?" Vanderboegh says the tactical question is easy: Kill the enemy one soldier at a time. A patriot needs only a "cheap little pistol and the guts to use it," he writes, to shoot a soldier in the head and take his rifle; with a friend, such a man will soon have "a truck full of arms and ammunition." Vanderboegh is hardly a man of action himself, living these days on government disability checks. Even so, when he wrote a blog post in March urging followers to protest the health care bill by breaking windows at Democratic Party offices, they did so across the country.

Anyone else love that this clown lives off the government?

I think it boils down to self-pity, in the end, and a rage against your own impotence.  Regardless of the proximate cause- taxes, the ATF, the scourge of insurance companies no longer being able to deny pre-existing conditions- it is about bored people trying to make something heroic about their lives and being desperate to blame others.  Which I get, and there is certainly a lot of truth in thinking that large and powerful forces don't give a good goddamn about you.  However, that, among other reasons, is why I am a liberal.  For all the massive flaws of elected officials, I trust their response to citizenry a damn sight more than enormous corporations.  It is a bit disgusting and a large part terrifying that there are some people who disguise treason in the cloak of patriotism. 

Incompetence? Complicity? Or Bad Luck?

Nasser Arrabyee has an excellent piece on the escape of many AQAP fighters from the battle of Al Huta.  He calls it the "hit and run" style of fighting.  I don't know if this is deliberately Fabian, but it might be a pattern.  This isn't the first time AQAP has been surrounded and about to be crushed by the government before slipping away (not all of AQAP, of course- they are too diffuse to be slaughtered in one battle).  So this raises three possibilities.  Probably more, actually, with many sub-possibilities, but I've already typed the word "three", and I will be damned if I backspace.

1) Incompetence.  The Yemeni army, even with US training, isn't exactly a skilled and professional fighting force.  Sure, they stopped the pipeline attack, and that was good, but even with overwhelming numbers they were unable to capture or kill a cornered and desperate force.   They are trying, but just don't have the abilities or the leadership to have anything more than sporadic and limited success.

2) Complicity.  This is the conspiracy angle.  Salih loves getting US dollars, and knows that he has to be a willing partner.  The attack, following Brennan's visit, was a great example of a dude firmly on our side in all this.  He was trying to level a great blow against his and America's mutual enemies.  But letting them slip away ensures more dollars.   It is the double game we're all familiar with- taking money but letting the problem continue, on order to keep taking money. 

3) Bad luck.  Tough terrain, hostile locals (it was in the south, where there is already seething anger at the government), a quick and slippery opponent.  At Tora Bora, bin Laden and co. managed to slip away from the greatest army the world has ever seen.  How can you blame the Yemenis for similar misfortune? 

Temperamentally, I tend to lean toward 1 or 3- human events are far more the product of chance, circumstance and lack of planning than they are the result of conspiracy or long-term duplicity.  This is especially true in Yemen, where long-term planning is often over-whelmed with the immediate needs of the day. 

Now, Salih has obviously played the double-game before, fighting some terrorists but coddling others.  As I've argued before, I don't think this is sign of bad character- it is a sign that he is the President of Yemen, not the United States.  It is childish to think that he, or any other leader, would act solely and 100% in line with the US.   That said, I think that he is concerned with beating AQAP, since they are a constant thorn in his side and are intent on bringing him down.  My take is that while Salih wouldn't mind stretching things out, and almost certainly will, he also wants to successful operations- and not just for PR.

If this pattern continues though, I might be forced to change my mind and delete this post and swear all of you to silence, under penalty of torture.  But for now I'd be interested to hear which of the above three readers think is closest to the truth, or something else I haven't thought of.

Blogroll

Also thanks to that conference I was keyed into Selected Wisdom, an excellent newish blog by Clint Watts.  It is a lively and no-bullshit approach to CT, and you would all do very well to read it.  Of course, you probably already do, and I am again late to the party.  Still glad to be there, though.  A permanent link is on the side now. 

Foreign Fighters

I just spent a couple of days at the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Foreign Fighters Conference.  I was lucky enough to be on a panel with Chris Boucek and Barak Salmoni, both of whom blow me away with their knowledge and insight.   It's a real kick to get to do things like that.  The whole conference was fantastic, with excellent panels on Somalia, the Maghreb (a region that almost never gets talked about) and Af/Pak, as well as a free-wheeling and even contentious discussion of recent trends in the foreign fighter phenomenon.  The FPRI will have the whole thing on their site soon enough, and maybe we can get more into the latter discussion then (I don't want to summarize).  One of the things I got out of it was the lack of need for a comprehensive model when discussing these things, even though a model is sexy and elegant and has the veneer of summation. Everything is local and context-specific, and any unified theory will have more exception than rule.

One thing that was brought up in our Yemen panel, both by Chris and Barak (but not by your scribe) was the strange division between Yemen and Somalia.  This is something I have talked about, but not terribly well.  Those two countries are very close and have a lot of ties.  Political shorthand often obfuscates reality.  We see Yemen as a Middle East country and Somalia as an African one, but that distorts geographic facts.  Barak proposed calling the area the Northeast/Horn of Africa Continuum (or something along those lines- I didn't write it down), which would help to focus our thoughts, even if it is tougher on the tongue.   Chris elaborated on that, pointing out how  in academia, politics and especially in the military these are in separate branches, even though they have a vital relationship. 

My own contribution was about how the local context of Yemen could affect foreign fighters who are rushing there full of adventure and C4.  I think they will be a problem, but I am also pretty convinced that unless al-Wuhayshi can keep a strict control over the fighters, they will be an uncomfortable graft on the population.  AQAP has done an excellent job so far of cultivating tribal relationships, and this is a delicate balance.  I think that a glut of Pakistanis and Egyptians and even annoying Americans who got dumped and decided that was cause for jihad could potentially turn the population against them.  Who the fuck likes new converts? 

I also want to thank Jihadology's and AJG buddy Aaron Zelin, as well as reckless hobo Greg Johnsen for watching the webcast and sending in questions, though I don't think I answered either.

Laptop James Bonds

Esquire has a neat little article about counter-terrorism blogs, with a nice mention of Waq al-Waq (and includes, among others, Jihadica and the Jawa Report).  We are all lumped under the flattering headline of "Laptop James Bonds".   I suppose I'd pick Sean Connery, but am more likely more like Roger Moore. 

Apology

In the post two below, I sort of half-jokingly linked to Sarah Palin's Twitter feed.  I apologize to anyone who got sucked into a quagmire of paranoia and self-righteous anger.   Such as this.

Left: how can u "take on" the Tea Party? It's a MOVEMENT...of the people; u "taking on the people"? Did u really not know it's not 1 party? 9:09 AM Sep 21st via Twitter for BlackBerry® 

With all the talk from the Left re: who funds Tea Party Americans, one might point out the Left's "tea party" is Acorn, funded by Fed Govt 7:57 AM Sep 21st via Twitter for BlackBerry® 

These two posts contain 15000 examples of contradiction, ignorance, conspiracy-addled twaddle, and logical impossibilities.  Can you name 7?  

The big story

Obviously, the big on-going story is the fighting in Hawta between the government and al-Qaeda.  Anwar al-Awlaki may or may not be trapped, depending on who you believe less.  There have been casualties on both sides.  I don't think we'll know the full story of this battle for a couple of weeks.  Right now, it looks as if it may be a hinge moment, but those moments are recognizable only in retrospect, and what seems important now may end up being nothing.  We've been down this road before, so I don't want to jump to any huge conclusions.

But one undeniably interesting story is this, from The Yemen Observer.

A Yemeni tribal sheikh  said Tuesday  that  al-Qaeda fighters who are being cornered in a mountainous area  in   southern Yemen  threatened to kill him if he did not stop  trying to  negotiate with them.

“ I tried to contact with them for negotiations, but they told me to  stay away  from them, and they said they would kill me to closer to Allah (God) if I do not stop trying to talk to them,”   Sheikh Hassan Ba Hanhan of Al Huta said.

Again, this shows how little respect AQAP has for some Yemeni norms, even as it seeks to use others to solidify itself.  Right now, I am unsure if these threats come from a position of strength or weakness.  My instinct says weakness.  I think the ferocity of the fighting may have taken them off guard.  Another interesting part of that story is this:

Yaslem Bajanoob, chairman of the local council of Mayfa’a,  said that some people are hesitant to leave  their houses and properties because they are afraid of plundering and looting acts if the army storms the village.

Bajanoob said that the tribesmen held meetings today Tuesday and warned from any looting and plundering of their houses and properties.

Many complications in these battles.  Memories of the army looting and stealing after the 1994 war are still fresh.  Even the most secular Southerner, overjoyed at the destruction of fanatics, also is wary of the army.   I think that people tend not to want to project the messiness of their own lives to other countries.  Looking abroad, we tend to see enemy or friend, without knowing how the two can overlap, even though we see that in our politics all the time.   In Yemen, an enemy of AQAP can also be an enemy of Salih.  We have to embrace complexity instead of ignoring it. 

Obama's Decisions

Aaron Zelin has a thoughtful article in FP's The Middle East Channel today.   In it, he essentially asks: what happens if the Obama plan to eradicate AQAP works?   Will they then again look away from Yemen and focus on something else, ignoring the structural challenges that remain?  If they do, Zelin reminds us, we'll be dealing with this again and again.  It will be like those Saw movies: endless sequels that nobody I know wants to see. 

Zelin also brings up this provocative question:

Another issue has to do with the legality of targeting an American citizen. How the Obama administration decides to handle the situation with Anwar al-Awlaki will shed light on the United States' legal policy vis-à-vis the war on terror. Will it lead the United States down a slippery slope that further erodes the rule of law and its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community? Or, will it affirm Obama's statement in his inaugural address: "we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals."

 I would quibble slightly with the wording- I think this will show if Obama wants to lead us back up that slope, since we sprinted and tumbled ass-over-tea-kettle down it the last nine years, to the point where it is hardly shocking that a citizen could be killed extra-judiciously.   There is a case for it, of course- he is at war with the US.  I'm not a legal scholar, though, and am reluctant to sound off half-cocked on this.

There has been some talk of trial, though that brings up another boatload of questions both legal and political.   The Yemeni government might be more amenable to arresting and extraditing al-Awlaki if he can get a fair trial in the US.   I don't like the "kill or ok maybe capture" strategy, especially for someone who is as low-level as al-Awlaki, but it is better than "kill at all costs".  Obama has to be willing to withstand the empurpled bloviating of ignorant senators, commentators, and other slackers for whom nothing less than a "trial" at dawn followed by a noon execution will suffice.   Long term thinking has to be the key.  Zelin's article helps to shape that framework.

The Grand Chessboard

Or the little one. 

MOSCOW, Sep. 22 (Saba)- Yemen ambassador to Moscow Mohammed al-Hilaly denied on Wednesday reports over the Yemen national chess team played against the Israeli team within the framework o the World Chess Olympics in its 39th edition currently taking place in Russia.

In his statements to Saba, al-Hilaly said that the Yemeni chess team was surprised by the first round draw which placed it in front of the Israeli entity.

He added that the team withdrew from the game which made the organizing committee to set the Yemeni team as a loser and announced win for the Israeli entity team.

The ambassador emphasized that the news which circulated that the Yemeni chess team played against the Israeli team are false and baseless.

Because, you know, that would be awful.  

Look, I am ok with Arab solidarity and defending the Palestinians, especially with a far-right government in Israel (though the timing of this is a little off).  But sports, or at least competition, should generally be removed.  There is no need to punish the participants.  

This is one of those stories where you either get angry or shake your head and laugh.  I am leaning toward the latter, mostly because of the terms "false and baseless", which is a level of outrage normally only seen when another candidate circulates rumors that you might, in fact, be running a child sex ring.   Although I suppose that the late Bobby Fischer would approve of this tactic.  Perhaps the Yemenis were just paying homage to one of the best?