Yemen's Clever New Monetary Source

Ellen Knickmeyer has a good piece in Foreign Policy about how Yemen is essentially outsourcing their navy to guard ships trying to make it through the pirate-infused waters around the Red Sea and Aden.  The sub-headline, which I don't think she wrote, calls it a "gun for hire" strategy, which while accurate is a bit unfair.  This is a pretty good revenue stream for Yemen, and it isn't as if they are distributing their navy to far-flung shores while ignoring home: piracy and smuggling are issues in Yemen, and this can help the navy become more professional and better-trained.  As Knickmeyer points out, there is a lot of potential for corruption here, of course, but I don't have much of a problem with that.  For one thing, this isn't money that would otherwise be going elsewhere- it isn't aid that is being funneled into the pockets of well-connected cousins.  It is an outside and independent revenue-generating operation.  Yes, it would be better if one thought the money raised could dig wells and irrigation channels, but that is letting the perfect be the enemy of the good.

And I do think this can be good: one of the most important areas of income for Yemen is the Port of Aden- once great, now dangerous and dilapidated.  Insurance rates are exorbitant, and shipping companies are wise to avoid it.  This is crippling for Yemen.  If they can work to make the area safer, and develop an effective navy/coast guard (and this is one of the areas where the US has a long-term interest, and has been helping, albeit with a wax/wane kind of intensity), it can help revitalize the port.  Granted, that brings up a whole magilla about sharing the money, which gets to the heart of the southern issue, but it is better to be arguing about a whole pie than fighting over scraps.

Anyway, the article is well worth reading. 

Aden-Abyan Army

In his tape, Qasim al-Raymi announced the formation of an "Aden-Abyan Army" to directly fight against the government.  This will remind Yemen-watchers of the old-school Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, or the AAIA, in English shorthand.  I suppose, for a strategist like al-Raymi, there is no "I" in "Aden-Abyan Army." 

I really apologize for that, and will now get to the important part of this.

Announcing the formation of an army is a lot different than having one, of course.  But AQAP has never been much for idle threats or cheap bluster.  A question that a lot of people might have is: how is this any different than what they had?  The answer, glibly, is this: an army consists of foot-soldiers who have more talents than merely exploding. 

Here is a good quick read on this phenomenon- a post by Clint Watts over at Selected Wisdom called "Foreign Fighter Terrorism: Worry More About 'Fighters' Than 'Martyrs'".  Basically, when people move over to al-Qaeda, they are asked if they want to be fighters or martyrs- martyrs are going to do suicide-bombings, for fighters, however, "the message morphs to something more complicated: “I’ll fight the infidel, but if I survive, I’ll probably head home or to another safe haven and ultimately fight again somewhere else.” While ‘Martyr’ recruits are tactically devastating, ‘Fighter’ recruits have far greater strategic impact.  Only poor performing ‘Martyr’ recruits survive the battlefield but high performing ‘Fighter’ recruits are more likely to head back home (equipped with skills and combat experience) and become the thread for future jihadi campaigns at home or in the West."   Clint also points out that, in the Sinjar records, Yemenis were behind only Algerians in choosing fighter over martyr- a full 61% choose to do something more long-term than strapping a bomb to their chest.

With this possible new army in Yemen, you have some of the fruits of fighterdom and the roots for other battles.  Yemen will increasingly have a foreign fighter problem, and these people can be trained and dispersed.  But you also have an immediate problem.  It isn't well-known, because suicide bombings make for a more exciting newscast, and grasp our attention with an almost alien violence, but actual fighting forces have been a larger part of Qaeda's goal, particularly in Afghanistan, where in the 90s they helped the Taliban fight against the Northern Alliance.  And while it is true that it was a martyr who killed Ahamd Shah Masood, the Qaeda fighting forces kept him forever on his toes.  An army can continue to apply concerted pressure in tandem with the horrifying and random shocks of the martyrs. 

This would make sense for AQAP to do- a two-pronged attack inside Yemen while still putting their message out to the English-speaking world and hoping to inspire more lone-wolf attacks (incidentally, I am working on my thoughts on the new Inspire, and will get to them after lunch).   This continues to show that AQAP is able to take lessons from jihadi venues all over the world and integrate them into Yemen.  It would be a nice to have dumb as they are barbaric, but in Yemen we don't have that luxury.