Huthi Support, and the South

Greg- who's been on a Kerouak-like tear the last 24 hours, though presumably without the uppers- briefly parses Abd al-Malik al-Huthi's declaration of support for the demonstrations around the country.

Does this mean the Huthis, who have generally been good at following the various cease-fire agreements, suddenly break the latest one in the hopes that the combined pressure of different centers can force Salih's regime to crack? I don't know, but I doubt it.  So what impact, if any, does moral support from the Huthis count for? 


He then says that they are probably waiting to see which way the wind blows (he thinks that there has to be a make or break moment coming soon).   While I think this is probably accurate, and I agree that they aren't likely to break a cease-fire, I don't think they have to for the "combined pressure" front to work.  


This is a boon for the Huthis.  The government cannot have its attention everywhere, and this allows them more time to regroup in case Salih emerges victorious and even more angry than before.  Ideally, for the Huthis, the Salih government is toppled and is replaced by either a weak leader in control of San'a and maybe Taizz, or by nothing at all.  In either case, they get what they want, which is a return to autonomy (some might argue they want a return to the Imamate; others that they'll just let Iran carve out a piece of the country.  Both fun and exciting theories, but probably best left to fantasy-land.) (Edit: the above link is an interesting article; I'm just being needlessly snarky about the Iran connection)


Right now the Huthis don't have to do anything.  The South seems like it is on the verge of exploding- the situation is probably far more tense there than in San'a, and maybe in Taizz.  There is certainly a longer history and worse memories, as well as a relatively more coherent political program.  Between the major cities of the "north" and the Southern Movement, as well as AQAP, who haven't gone away but seem a lot less relevant (for now), there are enough stressors to, if not knock Salih off, at least distract him. 


So, then: the South.  For years this has been the biggest issue, and still is.  It is wrong to say that they are inspired by the Tunisia and Egypt; they have been at this for years.  Where the inspiration might come in is the suddenly visible brass ring of success.  An emboldened opposition and harried Salih might push Yemen to the breaking point, and the dream of seceding could be within reach.  I think right now they are clearly separate from the protests in San'a and Taizz, even if they echo each other, with the calls for democracy and a chance at a decent life.  But for now in the South it is still secession. 


So, then, this is a question.  This is not policy advice or a cocksure guarantee, but a barely-formed thought.  Stipulating that if the south goes, Yemen as a centralized state will no longer be viable (which I agree with), and given that it isn't in US interests for that to happen, do we see an opportunity here?  Would the Southern Movement be placated, or at least temporarily appeased, if Salih was replaced with a promise of democracy?    Is that the only chance to hold the country together?  And, if so, should the US and the West throw their weight behind the demonstrators before it is too late?  Or is that way too big of a gamble?   And even if that is a possible course, do we have the skill or the means to pull it off?  I am in the camp that America can't do everything it wants, both morally and practically- there is a limit to our power and influence.   Even with aid, I am doubtful that we can ease Salih out, but it isn't impossible.  I fear that in this scenario our best way to do so is through the army, whose taking of power, even if it comes with hand-over-the-heart guarantees of just being transitional, won't exactly be met with acceptance in the south.   So what should be the play? 

Kind of on cue...

Police open fire in al-Mukalla.

Witnesses say police have opened fire to break up an anti-government protest in Yemen, and security officials say one protester has been critically wounded.

It was not immediately clear whether the police were using live ammunition or rubber bullets.

Hat-tip here to Jane Novak's Twitter feed.  I know, right?  Wherever we might disagree on analysis, she does a great job as an activist for the Yemeni people.

Here's a map of Yemen in case you were wondering where al-Mukalla is.  About 3/5 up the southern coast.  It is in eastern Yemen, but the often-misleading political shorthand there is "the South".

(Not pictured: guns)

Yemen's Clever New Monetary Source

Ellen Knickmeyer has a good piece in Foreign Policy about how Yemen is essentially outsourcing their navy to guard ships trying to make it through the pirate-infused waters around the Red Sea and Aden.  The sub-headline, which I don't think she wrote, calls it a "gun for hire" strategy, which while accurate is a bit unfair.  This is a pretty good revenue stream for Yemen, and it isn't as if they are distributing their navy to far-flung shores while ignoring home: piracy and smuggling are issues in Yemen, and this can help the navy become more professional and better-trained.  As Knickmeyer points out, there is a lot of potential for corruption here, of course, but I don't have much of a problem with that.  For one thing, this isn't money that would otherwise be going elsewhere- it isn't aid that is being funneled into the pockets of well-connected cousins.  It is an outside and independent revenue-generating operation.  Yes, it would be better if one thought the money raised could dig wells and irrigation channels, but that is letting the perfect be the enemy of the good.

And I do think this can be good: one of the most important areas of income for Yemen is the Port of Aden- once great, now dangerous and dilapidated.  Insurance rates are exorbitant, and shipping companies are wise to avoid it.  This is crippling for Yemen.  If they can work to make the area safer, and develop an effective navy/coast guard (and this is one of the areas where the US has a long-term interest, and has been helping, albeit with a wax/wane kind of intensity), it can help revitalize the port.  Granted, that brings up a whole magilla about sharing the money, which gets to the heart of the southern issue, but it is better to be arguing about a whole pie than fighting over scraps.

Anyway, the article is well worth reading. 

The danger of al-Qaeda

Heavy fighting in Hawta today, in the south.  The army is taking it to AQAP, or at least trying to- it seems that the militants have a better chance at living once the army gives them their full attention.  Although it might be assumed as much, I don't think this is a direct result of Counter-terrorism chief John Brennan's talks with Salih.  I don't think the talks hurt, of course, but it has been my contention that Salih sees AQAP as enough of a threat to his regime that he wants to be going after him.  As far as AQAP is concerned, there is no double game. 

But that can also be a problem.  The fighting is displacing thousands in an already explosive and on-the-edge south.   This is creating yet another IDP nightmare for a government that may or may not have the will, but certainly does not have the means, to deal with it. 

Brennan's advice to Salih has to mention that while he eradication of AQAP is a fine goal, try not to burn the country to the ground in doing so.  There has to be support for what could be perceived as failure, even if it looks bad in the press and no-nothing mouth-breathers criticize Obama for "weakness."   In a speech at the US Institute for Peace, Daniel Benjamin outlined the administration's strategy for Yemen, and it seems they are taking the long view, at least in theory.  I hope this is the case.  It is tough in today's 1-hour news cycle to be able to slow-foot things and work 10 years down the road, especially with such a volatile issue as terrorism.  But to not do so is insane. 

A few more Yemen links

(Remember when I sometimes wrote about things other than Yemen on this?  Me neither.) 

Haley Sweetland Edwards has a good article on the southern problems in the LATimes, much better and more fact-based than my rambling post below. 

There is war talk along the southern Yemen coast and the flag of rebellion is painted on the stocks of guns. The separatists call this land South Arabia, and villagers say it's only a matter of time before insurgency erupts.

"We are ready to fight. All of us. Men, women and children," said Zahra Saleh Abdullah, a separatist leader, sitting in a living room with a dozen would-be rebels in Yafa, a restive tribal territory in the south. "Yemen is not our country. South Arabia is our country."

In economic news, the World Bank has released a report about the upturn and potential in Yemen's economy.  As I tend to fall into a deep and restful sleep reading economic reports, I am grateful for its summary.   The report is surprisingly optimistic, basing itself on an uptick in oil prices and the LNG pipeline.  This is good news, although I tend to think it is misleadingly rosy- prices went up again this year after correcting themselves last year, and it is a fools game to predict these things or to think they will remain stable.  Yemen's oil economy might be able to stay afloat, but it is clearly unsustainable and unsteady.  Perhaps Yemen-philes can keep their fingers crossed for more catastrophic spills in the Gulf of Mexico.  Here's hoping! 

In completely unrelated news, the Sox game today opened with Juan Pierre taking a walk and then Omar Vizquel getting a hit.  This is as close to a near-zero chance occurring, not just in baseball, but in the entire known universe.

We Now Return To Semi-Regular, Haphazardly-Scheduled Blogging

Nervous times in Yemen.  This Saturday, the 22nd, is the 20th anniversary of unity, a difficult, shambling, often-bloody and perhaps terminally-failed experiment.  As anyone following Yemen knows, the south (a political term which also encapsulates much of the eastern portion of the country) has been in a steadily-rising revolt against what they see as essentially a military, cultural and economic occupation by the north.   The revolt has increasingly gotten more and more violent, concurrent with but not proportional to the crackdown by President Salih.  Of the "three revolutions" in Yemen- the south, the Huthi rebellion, and the threat of al-Qaeda- the secession movement is probably the least-covered but most important.   The bulk of oil and gas reserves are in the south, and as we've seen with nearly every separation or divorce in history, the rump countries left over rarely manage to be stable or peaceful.  The loss of revenue would be a death-blow to the Salih regime (not to mention the final nail in the coffin of his credibility).  And, my guess anyway, the fervor which unites revolutionaries is generally just a mask for internal divisions which bubble bloodily to the surface once power is gained and has to be divided.   I doubt the south could make it for very long.  I realize that such a statement is in line with Salih's propaganda, but a statement is not false simply for coming from a distasteful mouth.   

Anyway, this Saturday is Unity Day, and not just any Unity Day, but the 20th Anniversary.  In theory, of course, this is no more significant than the 19th or the 23rd, and unity is no more or less certain on Saturday than it would be on Friday or Sunday.  But symbolism is important in politics, especially the immediate life-and-death politics that Yemen is facing.   It seems a near-certainty that both sides will be using the date to push their storyline- for Salih, the tenuous but undeniable success of a unified Yemen; for the southerners it will be a story of irreconcilable differences and failure. 

In light of that, this is an interesting story: Salih has predictably released 19 separatists from jail.  This is a normal move in a quasi-authoritarian state, especially one in which power is personified.  The move is to show reconciliation and brotherhood, a patching-over of differences.   This is something which usually has some success- even if no one believes in the purity of motive, it shows a willingness to step back from the breach.  This obviously isn't the first time Salih has released Southerners, or anyone- imprisonment and release is a normal part of Yemeni politics- but it will be interesting to see the level of symbolic gestures we see in the next five days, and how they will be received or reciprocated.  While not a flawless augur, they might help us see the outlines of the near-future.

North and South

Back to Yemen, despite the thousands of emails I received asking for more college basketball analysis (note: this did not happen). 

Human Rights Watch has released a report about war crimes in the last round of the Huthi Rebellion.  You can take "last" to mean either "latest" or "final", depending on your disposition.   I think it is important in that it also mentions war crimes committed by the rebels, something that isn't much discussed.  Obviously, the crimes of Salih's government- carpet bombing, indiscrimnate shelling, the destruction of villages- are going to grab the headlines.  Regardless of what one feels about any specific rebellion, the power of the state is what attracts attention.  But the report talks of Huthi shelling, of deploying in populated areas, and of using child soldiers- something which we need to know to get a full picture.

However, as uncomfortable as it is, in the immediate political arena the crimes of the Huthis are meaningless.  They don't need to apologize to the government for putting innocents and children at risk; it is not as if the regime was overly concerned with their welfare anyway.  For reconciliation to happen, Salih is going to have to admit mistakes and apologize and be the one mending fences.  The Huthi leaders will have to reconcile as well, but Salih is the one who will bear the brunt of it if he hopes to avoid another hideous and unwinnable war.  That is just the nature of things, and it gets back to my argument that he is going to have to cede some control if he hopes to retain any.    Reconciliation seems to be inching its way toward a remote possibility, though, if prisoner releases are any indication.  

Meanwhile, bombings, strikes and arrests seem to indicate the south is moving closer to a HRW report themselves.   We're moving closer an closer to unity's 20th anniversary- anyone want to take bets on if the celebrations will also be an obituary? 

Looking for good news?   Yemen LNG has announced that they have opened another line, and this one ahead of schedule.   Despite all the delays, the liquefied natural gas project has turned out to be a success, despite the overwhelming political problems.  In an of itself, it can't save Yemen's economy, but it can perhaps be a demonstration that things can go right in Yemen, and that it might not be a losing bet. 

Happy Birthday...

...to one of my favorite blogs. The other day, Nasser Arrabyee celebrated the first anniversary of his blog. I know I have said this before, but his is an extremely valuable work- top-notch journalism and analysis. Required reading on Yemen.

In light of that, here is an article of his about the trials and tribulations of southern leaders.  In it, you see that various leaders are being sentenced, denounced as traitors even as they insist these are political show trials.  Those being sentenced include former Parliamentarians and even an Ambassador.  

This is usually the beginning of the end for a regime.  This isn't the first time, god knows, that Salih's enemies find themselves in prison.  But the Southern Movement is obviously growing, and the regime is creating rallying points for secessionists, and at the same time essentially confirming southern propaganda.   It is as if you accused me of being a hot-head, and I was so upset by the accusation I punched you and your dog in the face. 

I am not trying to say that this regime will fall because of these trials- but historically these moves resemble panic and create a series of self-fulfilling prophecies.  More phony trials lead to more protests decrying injustice.  Protests are quashed, many are arrested, and you have more trials.   I have enormous sympathy for the Southern Movement, but they are not entirely in the clear here.  I find there calls for secession understandable, but unreasonable and potentially disastrous. (Partly because I don't think a suddenly independent southern state is feasible.)   But the onus is clearly on the President- he has the most power to put the plug back in this drain.   It is up to him to try to provide at least the barest modicum of trust.  These trials do exactly the opposite. 

That should do it!

Southern Movement?  Solved.

ADEN, March 19 (Saba)- The biggest flag of Yemen was ever made in Aden province in preparation to celebrate the National Day on May 22.

Head of the local council of Tawahi district in Aden Mohammed al-Jobari said to Saba that the flag is 75 meters long and 8 meters wide and its flagpole is 20 meter tall.

The Republic of Yemen was established on May 22, 1990, with the merger of North Yemen and South Yemen.

On May 22, 1990, President Saleh raised the first flag of the Republic of Yemen in the city of Aden to officially declare the re-unification of Yemen.

To give you some perspective on how large a flag that is, think about it like this: that is a really, really big flag.

Flags are symbols, of course, and I can kind of understand the meaning behind this.  A giant flag of a unified Yemen will show the world that the fragile country is still whole and proud, despite a few rabble-rousers and sabotuers.   But still- if you are a southerner inclined to support the goals of the movement, and are influenced by its rhetoric, doesn't this just seem to be a provocation?   An enormous symbol of the oppressor, of colonialism, the marking of a state you no longer wish to be a art of, casting massive shadows over your putative capital. 

I don't want to overstate this (ok, I do, but am restraining myself).  Little things add up, and I don't think anyone doubts the power of iconography.  I am just a little worried about a collective mindset that would think this is either meaningful, or- worse- useful.

The second link goes to a Nasser Arrabyee article about arrests in the south.  Crimes such as smashing car windows near a public school have people arrested as secessionists.  They might be, but there is the unmistakable air of a larger, and ultimately self-defeating, broader crackdown.

South Words*

As we all know, and as I feel I have said about 1100 times in the last two and a half months, Yemen has just recently been thrust into to global limelight.  It is slipping a bit, but will be a number 3 or 4 story for the near future, and probably beyond that.  Something is going to explode somewhere, and there will be a rash of stories again. I hope that isn't the case, but were I a gambling man- and I am- I would bet on it.

So, for people new to Yemen, I think the sudden uptick of news about a southern rebellion is strange and even mystifying- why now?  Is this new?   How important is this?

The answer to the last question the hypothetical reader asked is: very.  Greg and I have argued for a long time that the Southern Movement represents the most critical of the "three rebellions", and the one with the most potential to split Yemen apart.  This would be a disaster, because I agree with President Salih that you wouldn't have a new and unified state in the south- I think it would be chaotic and largely uncontrollable.  What Salih doesn't mention is that the same thing would happen to the north, suddenly deprived of the income of the south.  Meager as that may be, the oil, gas and shipping revenue is basically the bulk of the economy.

The Uses of Propaganda

I haven't talked at all about President Salih's website, which, in English, is clearly aimed at a Western audience.  It is obviously propaganda, geared toward those who might be able to give money to the country.  This is fine, of course, and something that is needed, but due to vague dismissals regarding its nature and the constraints of time, I have pretty much ignored it.

But, really, it is important, even if sometimes silly.  Its unintentional messages are just as important- if not more so- than the predictable point of view it is trying to promote (I will not get into symbolic interpretations of the main picture, in which the President is seemingly giving medicine to a child, but looks as if he is performing a spontaneous, unnecessary and malicious tooth extraction).

The message today, regarding a talk that Salih gave at the Higher Military Academy, has the headline "I want to be a soldier to serve the nation".  This, of course, is psuedo-inspiring speech-making, with its echoes of sacrifice and willingness to lay down your own identity for the good of the country.    It is uncomfortable to hear coming from the head of an increasingly martial government, but I am willing to chalk it up to the audience.   However, I'll quote at some length the meat of the article.

He accused the opposition Joint Meeting Parties of erupting problems in Saada and some districts of the southern provinces, saying that these parties announced their solidarity with the separatists who block the roads, loot stores and kill innocent people in these districts.

Regarding agreement signed with the JMP in February of 2009, president Saleh considered the deal as a big mistake made by the General People Congress Party (GPC).

It was a big mistake by the GPC, he said, the party had to go ahead alone to hold parliamentary elections with participation of these parties or not.

I am not familiar with accusations of JMP meddling in the north, but am not surprised, either.  That isn't the meat of it, though- the heart of this is the language of total opposition, of lines being drawn clearly, brightly, and irrevocably.   The JMP*, the most important and inclusive of opposition groups, is more or less officially an enemy of the state.  None of this is surprising- it has been coming- but it is still distressing.  Reconciliation, or at least an uneasy peace, grows more distant and unimaginable by the day.

It also makes laughable his statement in the speech, where he "said that if any one want power, he could have it via door not window, adding the power is available for all by elections box."   Not that anyone would have believed it, but it is red meat for a blogger to see an outright lie be immediately contradicted in the same article.

*Originally said GPC, which the opposite of reality.  Thus are the wages of blogging.  Thanks to Anon for pointing that out. 

On the South

Over at the Sana'a Bureau, Haley Sweetland Edwards has a couple of good articles on what is happening with the Southern Movement, particularly how the leadership is attempting to distance itself from Salih's accusations of kinship with al-Qaeda. I've argued for a while that the Southern issue is the single most important of the "three rebellions", and it looks like events there are speeding up.  I don't think we are quite past the point of no return yet, but it is getting really damn close.

Also, Greg continues to break radio silence by blogging at the possibly undead Waq al-Waq.

In the South

Robert Worth continues his work on Yemen in a Times article about the Southern Movement. (h/t: Wilken C) I think this is an important article, because as I've argued here and other places, I think the Southern Movement is potentially the most dangerous of all the three rebellions, with the best chance of tearing Yemen apart.  But the relatively minimal amounts of violence heretofore associated with it have relegated the Movement to a sidestage, mentioned with an off-handed shrug after al-Qaeda and the Huthi rebellion.

(A note: I am going to be saying "the south" and "the movement" here, but it is far more diverse and less unified than this might imply.  Also, geographically, "the south" is also the east, but I will use the political shorthand.)

I think Worth does an excellent job of painting the mood of the south, of how the movement went from a call for more economic rights and less oppression to an open secession movement.  I don't think that this was inevitable, but the ham-fisted reaction of the government, treating the south and is leaders with the same violent disregard as they did to the Huthi movement, reinforced their own loose caricature and helped to unify the opposition.

More Unrest in the South

An ambush today in the south killed two government workers, including "the director of a criminal investigations unit".  The article blames southern separatists, but does not go into further detail.  I would like to say that until it is proven, one should be a little of assigning blame.   It is not beyond the pale that this is connected to the Southern Movement (the growing movement agitating for independence), but it is not conclusive.

Regardless, this will help the further tensions.  The south and San'a are in a cycle of mutual retribution and accusation, with sporadic violence.  I personally feel that they are nearly, if not already, past the point of no return.  There is zero trust between the two sides, and each act of aggression or revenge- and once you are in this cycle, the two are indistinguishable- heightens that distrust.

The only way that both sides can get what they want is for the South to have increased autonomy, including control over its economy, but while still providing the government with the funds they need to maintain some order and power.  If there can be a mutually wary peace, time can be bought to deal with other problems, and trust can build.  But if there is war, neither side wins.  I deal with this in some more detail in a forthcoming article, and I will let you know when it comes out.

Aden

Interesting article about economic possibilities in Yemen's south today, particularly Aden and its port.   The beginning of the article focuses on an Indian entrepreneur named Ravinder Singh, who is amazed at the "manpower with the commitment of Yemenis."   This is nice, if a little condescending (people have to work hard to exist in a country with such meager resources).  But generosity of spirit, or basic decency, makes me assume that he was gearing his comments to a richer outside world of potential investors, who can sometimes see poverty as being the result of sloth.   The article is pretty optimistic, or at least what passes for optimism in Yemen these days.  It paints a different picture- that is, one of people wanting to work and make a life and not rushing off to put bombs in their underwear, and for that it is worth reading.

A few quick thoughts.  Aden is incredibly important to any economic future Yemen might have.  It was once one of the busiest ports in the world, just behind London, and is located in an impossibly great trade route.  It is easy to discount this, as Yemen is lumped in with "the Middle East", and is therefore assigned its own set of assumed properties: barren, isolated- near Syria, maybe?  But historically it is far more connected with the Horn of Africa and with India than, say, the Levant.  There is a reason the British wanted to colonize it- Aden is a great stop between the Suez and India.   If the port can be rebuilt and secured, it could once again become a major cash cow for Yemen (being secured is most important- bombings of the Cole and the Limburgh drove insurance rates to an unsustainable level).