Huthi Support, and the South

Greg- who's been on a Kerouak-like tear the last 24 hours, though presumably without the uppers- briefly parses Abd al-Malik al-Huthi's declaration of support for the demonstrations around the country.

Does this mean the Huthis, who have generally been good at following the various cease-fire agreements, suddenly break the latest one in the hopes that the combined pressure of different centers can force Salih's regime to crack? I don't know, but I doubt it.  So what impact, if any, does moral support from the Huthis count for? 


He then says that they are probably waiting to see which way the wind blows (he thinks that there has to be a make or break moment coming soon).   While I think this is probably accurate, and I agree that they aren't likely to break a cease-fire, I don't think they have to for the "combined pressure" front to work.  


This is a boon for the Huthis.  The government cannot have its attention everywhere, and this allows them more time to regroup in case Salih emerges victorious and even more angry than before.  Ideally, for the Huthis, the Salih government is toppled and is replaced by either a weak leader in control of San'a and maybe Taizz, or by nothing at all.  In either case, they get what they want, which is a return to autonomy (some might argue they want a return to the Imamate; others that they'll just let Iran carve out a piece of the country.  Both fun and exciting theories, but probably best left to fantasy-land.) (Edit: the above link is an interesting article; I'm just being needlessly snarky about the Iran connection)


Right now the Huthis don't have to do anything.  The South seems like it is on the verge of exploding- the situation is probably far more tense there than in San'a, and maybe in Taizz.  There is certainly a longer history and worse memories, as well as a relatively more coherent political program.  Between the major cities of the "north" and the Southern Movement, as well as AQAP, who haven't gone away but seem a lot less relevant (for now), there are enough stressors to, if not knock Salih off, at least distract him. 


So, then: the South.  For years this has been the biggest issue, and still is.  It is wrong to say that they are inspired by the Tunisia and Egypt; they have been at this for years.  Where the inspiration might come in is the suddenly visible brass ring of success.  An emboldened opposition and harried Salih might push Yemen to the breaking point, and the dream of seceding could be within reach.  I think right now they are clearly separate from the protests in San'a and Taizz, even if they echo each other, with the calls for democracy and a chance at a decent life.  But for now in the South it is still secession. 


So, then, this is a question.  This is not policy advice or a cocksure guarantee, but a barely-formed thought.  Stipulating that if the south goes, Yemen as a centralized state will no longer be viable (which I agree with), and given that it isn't in US interests for that to happen, do we see an opportunity here?  Would the Southern Movement be placated, or at least temporarily appeased, if Salih was replaced with a promise of democracy?    Is that the only chance to hold the country together?  And, if so, should the US and the West throw their weight behind the demonstrators before it is too late?  Or is that way too big of a gamble?   And even if that is a possible course, do we have the skill or the means to pull it off?  I am in the camp that America can't do everything it wants, both morally and practically- there is a limit to our power and influence.   Even with aid, I am doubtful that we can ease Salih out, but it isn't impossible.  I fear that in this scenario our best way to do so is through the army, whose taking of power, even if it comes with hand-over-the-heart guarantees of just being transitional, won't exactly be met with acceptance in the south.   So what should be the play? 

Editorial

I've got a piece up in The National about Wikileaks and AQAP/Houthi violence.   I'm not sure how my predictions or reactions have played out since I wrote it a few weeks ago, but luckily I wasn't saying anything short-term.

Paranoia Even Goya Couldn't Draw Ya

So, it probably isn't too surprising that the Huthis blame the US, by way of AQAP, for the murderous funereal bombing that threatens to open up a new front of violence inside Yemen.   There is a thick atmosphere of paranoia inside the country's politics.  President Salih lumps together the three threats of AQAP, Huthis and the Southern Movement- this is part cynical but part a logical extension of his belief that only he can hold the country together, an apres moi, le deluge mentality. (though one would have to ask: how much worse the flood?)  Everybody also blames Iran for the Huthis, despite lack of any evidence.  The Huthis and AQAP see the government as a pawn of the US and Israel, a notion that is being reinforced by the Wikileaks revelations.  Basically, you have the US and Iran fighting each other via al-Qaeda and the Huthis, respectively.  Israel fits in somewhere, probably supporting al-Qaeda (although, as I blogged about in April, AQAP was supposedly teaming up with anti-Hamas extremists in Gaza to attack Jews in both Israel and Yemen, so this isn't a perfect marriage).

This is the kind of thinking that comes from a poisoned and poisoning politics.  Despite the proliferation of NGOs, there is not an adequate public space inside of Yemen for politics to be hashed out.  Qat chews are a helpful outlet, and a wonderful part of life, but with the crackdown on press it is terribly surprising that the wildest conspiracy theories are ones that gain traction.  This is a mess of Salih's making.

I don't want to imply that paranoia is a strictly Yemeni or Arab phenomena.  There is plenty of paranoia in American politics as well- it is deeply a part of both the far left and mainstream, Tea Party right (who are not really "conservative", by any real definition).   I think it is part of human nature to see events as controlled and not left to chance and capriciousness and folly and short-sighted thinking.   While paranoids tend to be freaked out a lot, there is comfort there; paranoia is a safety blanket warmly shielding one from randomness.   In Yemen, where things are falling apart, and there is a history of outside interference, it is better to conjure a grand narrative than being buffeted by a series of ad hoc decisions.

In a strange way, I suppose it is almost reassuring that the Huthis blame the US for AQAP's attack.  Maybe there is a strong strain of thought preventing them from thinking fellow Yemenis could do such a thing.  Optimistic paranoia.   Maybe a happier Pynchon could do something with that.

AQAP v Huthi: This time, its personal

This might be a largely reactive day or two on the blog- I am waiting for Greg to release his rebuttal to Thomas Hegghammer's answer to the al-Awlaki debate.   I am not sure if I'll have anything interesting to add to it.  I know- since when has that stopped me?  Right now I am enjoying two top analysts duking it out.   Clint has also been doing excellent work on this over at Selected Wisdom.   This is much better than the old days, when we basically only had Jane Novak to argue with.

As for the probable AQAP attack on the Huthis, Will at the Yemen Peace Project has the statement and some good analysis.   I think he is right when he says that this probably isn't going to play particularly well among Yemenis.   As has been mentioned, there isn't exactly a deep theological divide between Zaydi Shi'ism and Sunni philosophy.  The difference is largely political, though it has been wrapped with more of a schismatic cloth in the war years- but that is still just the wrapping.  

I'm not sure if this attack is a push for more volunteers or a reaction to their arrival.  Foreign fighters generally don't have much respect for the lay of the land, and can push movements in more extreme directions.  After all, I didn't bust my hump across the Eurasian wilds just to take out some damned police officer.  That is for chumps and local teens.  Let's go after the real apostates.  It could also be a combination of the two, of course.

It is also possible that the attack is a result of a steeply-increasing sense of destiny.  AQAP hasn't been flawless, but it is human nature to look back on success with the feeling of inevitability- especially if you've convinced yourself you have a divine mandate.  This would be out of character for AQAP, where caution has been the rule, but it wouldn't be totally out of character for any successful revolutionary group.  You begin to believe your own clippings.   I am not yet ready to say this is probably the case; this is the smallest possible sample-size to analyze.

The most clever thing about this attack is how it undercuts propaganda.  What the hell is Salih going to say?  Stop attacking innocent Huthis?  Even US condemnation rings hollow; we haven't lifted a finger to stop scorched earth.   There is an opportunity here to slide into the role of honest broker, but it is a very small window and would require a lot more nuance than our strategy has provided.   I don't doubt all of this crossed the mind of the leadership, if not before the attack than shortly thereafter (they are excellent retroactive propagandists), but I still think this might be a case of bloody over-reach, the kind they have heretofore avoided.

Very quick thoughts on al-Jawf

I am traveling for the holiday and stealing a few minutes on a computer.  Basically, I feel that if the attack in al-Jawf is indeed the work of AQAP- and frankly, it might be; I haven't had time to do anything, so I apologize if this is outdated- this marks a very new and dangerous but morbidly positive step.  For years we've been arguing that AQAP has managed to avoid the schismatic violence that has marked much of Qaeda's existence.  In doing so, they have avoided the kind of backlash you saw in Iraq.  If this was them, then there are a couple of possible reasons.

1- They are increasingly emboldened, and feel that they can expand their circle of enemies.  Fight the government, fight the West, now they can take on more ancient and dogmatic enemies- Shi'ites (even though Zaydi's aren't anything close to Twelvers).

2- Command and control is splintering.  This doesn't have the hallmark of the low-risk/high-reward mentality we've seen heretofore.  This could have wild and unpredictable, splintering consequences.  It is possible that newer recruits have un-Yemeni ideas of how to do things, and are more aggressive and less patient.

(Of course, it is in AQAP's interest to create more chaos in the country, so it could be argued that this is a smart move, but it seems to go against their norm.)

Both of these could open up a scary chapter, but a less-disciplined, less-patient AQAP is one that isn't as scary in the long run.  Who knows?  AQAP showed a terrifying learning curve; maybe their decline will be just as steep.  It is way too early to tell, of course- this is all just idle speculation, fueld by three straight Thanksgiving dinners at three different places, with one more to go.

7th Round?

Oxfam released a report today saying that the ceasefire is offering hope in the north, but mentions the ongoing horror of landmines.   But Nasser Arrabyee tells us that efforts have been suspended due to Huthi intransigence.

Efforts of ending Al Houthi armed rebellion north of Yemen have stopped after alleged violations by the rebels including kidnapping 11 soldiers, mediators said Thursday.

"We have become convinced that the Al Houthi rebels are not serious in peace process, so we have suspended our work," said a statement by one the four committees in charge of supervising the implementation of the six conditions set by the government and accepted by the rebels to end the war in Sa'ada.

As we've talked about before, the truth here doesn't actually matter.  What matters is the willingness of the parties to believe the stories.  That is how wars start, or start again.  Needless to say, we are still in a breath-holding period.

Greg has a long post on Waq al-Waq (and just as you Wa-W junkies were getting over your DTs!).   He tells a great story about an important development: the investigation of land seizures.  This is an issue that gets to the heart of corruption in Yemen- powerful actors taking land from the poor and using it to enrich themselves.  It is a problem all over, but rings especially harsh in the South.  This is a small step, but an important one, and even an aamzing one, given the entrenched nature of the elites.  As Greg says, "just as Yemen is rightly criticized for its mistakes so too should it be praised for taking such difficult and positive steps."   Greg also briefly expands on my point that Huthi war crimes are not as important to the peace narrative as the government's, and questions how exactly they would be prosecuted. 

Finally, there is the story that has been everywhere, and which I've been slightly reluctant to touch.  I am talking, of course, about the 13-yr-old girl who died of internal bleeding following an arranged marriage. I've gotten some emails asking about this, but there isn't much to analyze.   There is no reaction other than to gnash your teeth in a sickened despair that such a thing could happen, that we live in a world where a young girl can be legally raped and die because of it.  There can be analysis- the poverty makes it impossible for parents to turn down a marriage offer, or that this is common in traditional societies.  But, in the end, none of that matters.  It may be imperialism, but that practice is a hideous dismissal of humanity.   That is all there is to say.

North and South

Back to Yemen, despite the thousands of emails I received asking for more college basketball analysis (note: this did not happen). 

Human Rights Watch has released a report about war crimes in the last round of the Huthi Rebellion.  You can take "last" to mean either "latest" or "final", depending on your disposition.   I think it is important in that it also mentions war crimes committed by the rebels, something that isn't much discussed.  Obviously, the crimes of Salih's government- carpet bombing, indiscrimnate shelling, the destruction of villages- are going to grab the headlines.  Regardless of what one feels about any specific rebellion, the power of the state is what attracts attention.  But the report talks of Huthi shelling, of deploying in populated areas, and of using child soldiers- something which we need to know to get a full picture.

However, as uncomfortable as it is, in the immediate political arena the crimes of the Huthis are meaningless.  They don't need to apologize to the government for putting innocents and children at risk; it is not as if the regime was overly concerned with their welfare anyway.  For reconciliation to happen, Salih is going to have to admit mistakes and apologize and be the one mending fences.  The Huthi leaders will have to reconcile as well, but Salih is the one who will bear the brunt of it if he hopes to avoid another hideous and unwinnable war.  That is just the nature of things, and it gets back to my argument that he is going to have to cede some control if he hopes to retain any.    Reconciliation seems to be inching its way toward a remote possibility, though, if prisoner releases are any indication.  

Meanwhile, bombings, strikes and arrests seem to indicate the south is moving closer to a HRW report themselves.   We're moving closer an closer to unity's 20th anniversary- anyone want to take bets on if the celebrations will also be an obituary? 

Looking for good news?   Yemen LNG has announced that they have opened another line, and this one ahead of schedule.   Despite all the delays, the liquefied natural gas project has turned out to be a success, despite the overwhelming political problems.  In an of itself, it can't save Yemen's economy, but it can perhaps be a demonstration that things can go right in Yemen, and that it might not be a losing bet. 

Programming Notes

I will be giving a talk about Pomona College in California (Claremont, near LA) next Monday evening.  If any readers want to come heckle you are more than welcome.  I am not sure the time and place, but I will let you know as soon as I do.

In the meantime, read this ReliefWeb article about IDPs in Yemen's north.  You'll get a sense that while Scorched Earth was a military success, it might make political reconciliation all the more difficult.

And while you are busy being unhappy, check out Paul Stephens' excellent piece on economic disparity in Yemen.  It is both gritty and learned, and continues the great work going on at The Sana'a Bureau.

War and Peace in Sa'ada

Nasser Arrabyee reports that the peace treaty is being implemented, slowly but surely. The main sticking point is the deployment of Yemeni soldiers along the Saudi border, a move resented by the rebels but demanded by the Kingdom. And, again, their blisteringly stupid involvement means that they have a disproportionately large voice at the negotiating table. But overall this is clearly the best news to come out of the north in a long time. Nasser also has a much more sobering piece, about the children of the war, caught up in an atavistic battle. 187 killed, 89000 displaced, hundreds of thousands denied education, and hundreds recruited to fight, on both sides (on the government side, it was child soldiers recruited by the loyal tribes- children were not directly fighting for the government. This is a distinction without a difference when it comes down to it, but I wanted to be clear). These dry numbers, born of violence, provide a peek into the problems of peace. The blame will fall, fairly or not, at the feet of the Salih and his army. And these are the people whose trust Salih needs to get to keep the country from continuing to deteriorate. This was the biggest strategic flaw of Operation Scorched Earth- while Salih could break the rebels, he probably only widened the gap between the tribesmen and his government.

Huthi Truce Holding?

Tensely.  Will it?  Well, we've been down this road before, about five times, but there are different elements in play this time.  Here's a few reasons why it might, and a few reasons why it might not.  Let's bullet-point this shit.

• Huthis are largely defeated militarily.  Salih's overwhelming assault- Operation Scorched Earth- was designed to incapacitate the Huthis so that he could deal with the country's other problems.  The intent was to break them.  The Saudis, with their relatively powerful military, aided in that.  Enormous human rights violations aside, this was successful.  The other "peace treaties" ended without political solutions and with the Huthis still able to fight.  This operation seems to have avoided the latter mistake.  
• The involvement of the West.  To its credit, the west seems to have recognized that merely beating al-Qaeda right now will not be enough to save Yemen, and to turn it away from being a safe haven for terrorism.   We also seem determined to not allow Salih to use our money to destroy his enemies.  We'll see if that works in practice, but in theory we are pressuring for a political solution.  For once, the West's interest in Yemen is not just focused on al-Qaeda. 
• Salih's intelligence.  The President needs the money to keep coming in to rebuild his patronage network, the single most important element to keeping him in power all these years.  The West is not excited about funding civil wars.  I think Salih knows that to stay in our already wary graces, he needs to play ball.  In a perfect world, he could get our money and crush his enemies.  Luckily, we are not in that world. 

And a few reasons why it won't.

• Our rhetoric doesn't always match reality.  It's been close to two months since America and allies really began to look at Yemen, and just now is the peace-treaty taking hold.  There has been pressure, but it seems more of a public suggestion type of pressure.  There certainly has been closed-door goading, but the money has still been flowing.  Salih knows that for all our talk, and even intentions, the need to destroy al-Qaeda in the short-term is overwhelming politically. 
• The narrative has shifted.  Inasmuch as the West paid attention to the Huthi conflict before, the government was always painted as the bad guy, mostly because of how the indiscriminate bombing caused heavy civilian casualties and an IDP crisis.  It was a pretty accurate painting.  Now it seems as if the story has become one of, at least, equal antagonists.  You still hear the misleading "Shi'ite rebellion" story, which no one in America likes to hear.  So while we don't want Salih to kill everyone, we also see the war as a struggle against a government we need, and not for a specific grievance.  Salih will be able to use that to keep money coming in, and paint his terms in a more favorable light.  This won't help with a long-term political solution.
• Neither will bombing the hell out of people.  Scorched Earth was a military success, but it is hard to entice people whose villages you destroyed back into the warm bosom of the state.  Trust is a long, long way off. 
• The Kingdom wants a piece.  It was lunacy for Saudi Arabia to get involved.  I understand that national pride might have been in play, a little, but not only did it get involved in an intractable foreign conflict, now it has its hands in on the difficult peace treaty.  The overbearing neighbor now feels it has to be at the bargaining table, which will throw a monkey wrench into everything.   Slaking Saudi pride is no mean feat. 

So, it looks like the final is 4-3, against this holding.  But clearly these aren't all weighted equal, and I am sure there are more arguments on either side.  But right now I feel these are some of the elements at play.  Readers are invited to tell me why I am wrong, or to add to either side, in the comments. 

Huthi Analysis

Nasser Arrabyee has an excellent look at the cease-fire in the north: who gets what, who needs what, and what the sticking points are.  Not surprisingly, Saudi interference is making this even more difficult (for example, they want the border areas to be flooded with Yemeni soldiers; one wonders what that will do to decrease tension).  Read the whole thing.  It is excellent, as his reporting consistently is.

Huthis hand over Saudi soldier

In the middle of a tense and imperfect truce, the Huthis have returned one out of five Saudi soldiers they have been holding hostage, following an ultimatum by the kingdom.  One hopes that the other four are still alive.  I would have to think that if they are the Huthi reluctance to release the rest of them stems from the need to still have a card in their hands.   That is what makes this such a difficult time- the Huthis don't have much to play with, but if they are too reluctant to act it will no longer matter, and we'll have violence again.  We have atmosphere where there is absolutely no trust between any of the players- even San'a and Riyadh, ostensible allies against the rebels, have a long history of disdain.  Don't hold your breath waiting for a good outcome here.

Propaganda in the Huthi Rebellion

Nasser Arrabyee reports that the governor of the Sa'ada province is claiming that the Huthi rebels are responsible for 1500 civilian deaths in the latest round of fighting.  Needless to say, this number is not verifiable.  And, coldly, it doesn't matter if it is true.  What matters is that it is being said.  From a human side, one is too many, but in a civil war the truth is just another battleground.

What the government wants to do is to further shift the perception of the war both to his people and to the outside.  Before the Christmas bomber and the intense focus on Yemen, reports of the war largely and correctly painted the government as the brute, with its carpet bombing and refusal to let outsiders observe what was happening.  But since the new year, and with the focus on AQAP, there has been a slight shift, where the Huthis are something that need to be dealt with in order to stop terrorists.  There is still pressure for negotiation, but I think president Salih has seen an opening.

This isn't the first time, of course, that official statements have tried to highlight the ruthless iniquities of the rebels- they have been portrayed as puppets of Iran and bloodthirsty nation-wreckers, violent and atavistic remnants of a cruel Imam.   And there is some truth there- neither side has clean hands.

But unless they are "our" rebels- and Shi'ite enemies of an ostensible ally clearly are not- the term "rebellion" will always be a loaded one.  Salih recognizes this, and if he can help to paint the picture when people are finally paying attention, then it will make it easier for him to get what he wants.

Again, the government might not be wrong.  But what this highlights is the need for the Friends of Yemen, the Facebook-echoing international working group, to pressure the government to let the world take full account of what is happening in that northern fastness.  That is the only way to make the dead more than a number to be kicked around by equally relentless protagonists.