Arrrgh: A Reasoned Statement on Yemen

New York Republican Peter King is the new chair of the House Committee on Homeland Security.  This combines a lot of my favorite things, because the Honorable King is not only a crazy person who is terrified of Muslims, but he is a wild hypocrite who hates Islamic terrorism but has a history of being totally in love with the IRA.   I am Irish (American), and vaguely believe in the cause of one Ireland, but despise the IRA, and, when it comes down to it, don't really care.  History is the nightmare, and all of that.  Anyway, King standing for two things I hate- Islamophobia and the degradation of the Irish- manages to combine with possibly my least favorite thing, the elevation of Anwar al-Awlaki into a Bondian supervillain, in today's committee hearing.

"I actually consider Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula with al-Awlaki as a leader within that organisation probably the most significant risk to the US homeland," National Counterterrorism Centre head Michael Leiter told the committee.

(Note: for some reason this is from as Australian news feed, which explains the wildly anti-American spelling of center.)

I am actually pretty happy he said that al-Awlaki is just "a leader", rather than "the leader", although in his prepared statement Leiter only highlighted al-Awlaki when talking about the group, saying:

Anwar al‐Aulaqi, a dual U.S.‐Yemeni citizen and a leader within AQAP, played a significant role in the attempted airliner attack and was designated in July as a specially designated global terrorist under E.O. 13224 by the US Government and the UN’s 1267 al‐Qa’ida and Taliban Sanctions Committee. Al‐Aulaqi’s familiarity with the West and his operational role in AQAP remain key concerns for us.

As anyone who reads this blog, and really anyone who doesn't, knows, this is: crazy.   There are so many more people in AQAP who are a much greater threat than al-Awlaki.  I am pretty glad about the rest of what I have read, and plan to do a semi-live blog tomorrow (I was busy today).  I think it looks like the admin knows that the franchises are increasing in importance.  But whether it is pandering or ignorance, our bloody-minded fixation on the one guy who speaks English might be our biggest stumbling block in establishing a decent and sustainable policy in Yemen.

Today in Links!

Yeah, it is a lazy post.  I'm finishing up an academic-style paper, which I haven't done in like 10 years.  Bear with me.

First, of course, is the blogshocking news that Waq al-Waq is leaving the safe confines of blogspot in order to go to The Big Think.  You can access it here.   Hopefully, this will get more people reading Greg, which is always a good thing.   It goes without saying that his always-amazing analysis has survived the mood.

Carnegie has video up of last week's talk about Yemen by John Brennan, assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.   He talks about a comprehensive strategy that isn't just CT, but we'll believe that when we see more tangible evidence.   Again, I think CT is the most immediately important step, but it has to be done in tandem with other things, to alter impressions.  And also to do good, but I'm speaking from a strict policy standpoint. 


Alex in Jordan was kind enough to send out this AFP story about the Holder interview (and I like to have wire stories in unusual places).   This is my favorite line. 

"He's on the same list with Ben Laden," said US Attorney General Eric Holder, speaking on US television.

"He's up there - one, two, three, four. I don't know. He's on the list of people that worry me the most," Holder told ABC television news. 

I like Holder, and the charitable interpretation is that he is just saying what people want to hear, but in reality al-Awlaki is number 100.  But I doubt that is the case.  


Although, to be perfectly fair, the AG is far more concerned with things that are going on inside his country.  Holder is not in charge of the CIA.  Al-Awlaki has American citizenship and seems tasked with getting dummies in the US to blow shit up.  These actions fall far more under Holder's writ than CT inside Yemen.   That said, this seems to pretty much reflect the mentality of the political and media class about al-Awlaki's importance. 


Finally, here's a press release out of Darien, CT.  Darien is having a lecture series in Jan/Feb about the Arabian Peninsula, featuring heavyweights like Chris Boucek, Barbara Bodine, Isobel Coleman and David Ottaway.  Your blogger will be there on the 20th, talking about how AQAP multiplies the rest of the threats inside Yemen.    Darien is very close to NYC, so make your plans now.  Now!

A rhetorical question on Awlaki

Greg has a lengthy and worthwhile counter in the "how important is al-Awlaki debate".   I agree largely with his points, although I am beginning to stray from the "he's a nothing" camp very, very slightly- though through no particular skill of his own.   I've said before that he is basically a reality show jihadi, someone who is famous largely for being famous.  That said, of course, public relations is a huge part of international terrorism, and his fame, however unearned, is not entirely irrelevant.

I'm going to quote something from Greg's piece, which is not the thrust of the excellent analysis, but is important to what I want to talk about.

Also, isn’t it possible that knowing what we know AQAP and its development that as the Obama administration talks about al-Awlaki and as the media focuses on him, AQAP continues to push him forward, hoping to take advantage of all the free advertising? Basically, hoping that his name and association with AQAP can bring them more western recruits.  

This would explain his “poorly veiled coming out” and the reason AQAP didn’t talk about him prior to the attempt on Muhammad bin Nayyif and the Christmas Day plot, because he wasn’t integral to either one, including the one on the US. But as the Obama Administration focused on him, AQAP kept pushing him more and more to the front and now, after the parcel bomb plot we have a “Foreign Operations Unit” that he may or may not be the head of. 

Greg and I agree on this- the admin and the media have pushed him forward, possibly transforming him from a fairly obscure cleric about for whom one would have to twist and torture loose connections to make into a major figure to someone who "may or may not be the head of" a new unit in AQAP.  My take on the unit is that it is a sideshow for the leadership, a cheap way to do things on the side, but not part of their major plans.  Regardless, there is the potential for al-Awlaki to "inspire" people to do bad things in the US.

I agree that right now taking him out would only make things worse.  He isn't important enough to waste time and resources on, and because he is still largely unknown in Yemen, it would look punitive and reactionary and totally unnecessary to the people we need to court.   Ideally, we would stop focusing on this guy and his immature violence-junkie sidekick Samir Khan and they could recede from the foreground.  But I am not expecting the media to let go their hold on a charismatic English-speaker who is part American.  

So, and here is the rhetorical- will there be a point when, given the trends, al-Awlaki will become important enough to take out, if not by arrest than by assassination?  Can anyone foresee that day, or is it ludicrous?  It is partly philosophical, partly tactical- can our incessant pimping of his importance make him important?  I don't have an answer- I lean toward "no", but some other events which I need to write about could persuade me otherwise.   Do any of you have any thoughts?

Disease and Antidote

The Wall Street Journal has an op-ed piece by Con Coughlin chastising the West for its naivete regarding several key AQAP players, most importantly Anwar al-Awlaki.   It does not, of course, offer other tactics that could have been used, just shame and fear.  Since this article is as stupid and as guilty of over-blowing Awlaki as anything, this is a good time to link to this: Aaron's takedown of the Awlaki hype.  My kind of writing- both angry and informed.   Hold on to this and read it anytime you see the words "AQAP mastermind" or "the new bin Laden." 

We'll see who wins this battle: the weight of popular opinion or a few ill-tempered and unshaven (presumably) bloggers?   I'm guessing the former.

Super-Lawnmower Death Cars and the Banal Petulance Of American Jihadis

So the new Inspire is out (Aaron has it easily accessed at Jihadology), and the biggest story that seems to be coming out of it is of the American jihadi Samir Khan, who seems to be more important to the magazine than even Anwar al-Awlaki.  Most stories I have seen focus on him, and how he escaped the FBI and was able to travel easily to Yemen even though he had been writing about jihad for some time.  I agree that it is a failure, and one for which people need to be held to account, even though I have a feeling he is inflating his own derring-do.

What I want to focus own though is not how he did it, but who is is, and do so by looking at his writing and the magazine.  There is no doubt that the magazine is technically sophisticated and shiny and an appealing, easy read.  There are a lot of exciting pictures of explosions and short articles and little nuggets of infotainment*, which can suck in an internet-addled mind.  I think that is the point of this: despite its sophistication, it is childish and patronizing and seductive to people who desire to be told what to think. 

There is a little picture, for example, of President Obama, clipped and ragged to look like it was cut out of a magazine, with a quote by him saying "Our enemies are al-Qaeda who are trying to kill us but who have killed more Muslims than just about anybody on earth", followed by a parenthetical comment that he is "(speaking as if America hasn't killed more than a million Muslims in Iraq (before the invasion) and don't have blood on their hands from Afghanistan, Palestine, Sudan and elsewhere.)"  Underneath that, looking like it was tacked on, in what looks to be like a psuedo-Arabic comic font, is the addition of "JUST RIDICULOUS!"   The whole page smacks of a combination of office bulletin board and irritating, shrill political blog. 

This is the point, though- it isn't for sophisticated jihadists, or even for people with particularily well-developed minds.  They aren't the potential recruits in America or the West.  The recruits are people who are bored, pathetic, juvenile, and lonely.  The kind of people who watch Fight Club and see themselves in it, desperate for some excitement.  They blame society for rejecting them, and take their outsider status as proof of greatness, even though they generally lack any ability or inspiration that creates real, artistic or political outcasts.  

You can see this pretty clearly in Khan's writing.  There is a lot of inflated self-importance mixed with classic teenage-like, petty-reactionary bullshit.  There is a railing against people who work 9-5 jobs, who define themselves by what they buy or what they do.  There is a pervasive feeling of "I'm better than you", which you can find in all sorts of unformed and scared minds, whether they take solace in Atlas Shrugged or On the Road (though the people who take only that message from On the Road are reading it wrong- as I did the first time, and as millions do.  Khan's take is Kerouak as read by Qutb).   I understand the appeal of this kind of thinking.  I was 17 once as well.  We live in strange times, and people want to latch onto something. 

There is an easy correlation between these thoughts and violence.  The desperate mind looks to violence as a way of making yourself greater and finally shaking off the shackles imposed on you by the norms and the Rotary Club and all those fucking jocks.  I'm going to quote some of Khan's writing, which I think goes a long way of showing the child-like infatuation with violence that is inherent in most radicals, and particularly jihadis.  

I am acutely aware that body parts have to be torn apart, skulls have to be crushed, and blood has to be spilled in order for this (a caliphate) to be a reality.  Anyone who says otherwise is not prepared to make sacrifices that heroes and champions make.  

One has to say: come on.  Skulls have to be crushed?  This is not a serious person, but rather one with deep-seated issues and a desire to be remembered no matter what.  Heroes and champions?  Please.  Throughout the article he uses the a language mashed-up from comic books and revolutionary tracts, with talk of blood-suckers and parasites and the glory of violence.  Of course these people are dangerous, but they are not super-terrorists. 

This is also illustrated in what has been a much-discussed section of Inspire, the Open-Source Jihad, which gives tips to people in America who want to act on their own.  The tip this issue?  I wish I was joking when I said it was for "The Ultimate Mowing Machine".  The picture is of a huge Ford pickup roaring through a storm, awesomely lit by lightning and looking for the world like it is just going to burst through your screen and drink your beer and take your woman, you Vespa-riding pansy.  I am willing to bet it was taken directly from Ford- death to America, indeed.

Anyway, the tip is to attach some kind of blades to the front and just plow right the fuck into a crowd of people, mowing them down.  No doubt this would be scary if someone could get it to work.  But come on: this isn't how to sneak plutonium in though Canada.  This is something a 9th-grader doodles while thinking about gym class.   This is just stupid violence-porn, the kind of thing that Dylan Kliebold and Eric Harris might dream up.  It is sick and twisted and simple enough to work, maybe (I don't know how exactly, but then I feel a sense of pride when successfully changing a tire, so what the hell do I know?).  But we really can't afford to spend too much time worrying about al-Awlaki or Khan or Inspire helping people bring us down from the inside.  Fighters and real jihadists are far more worrisome than the sugar-high ravings of outcasts.  Just give them some time and they'll find out about The Doors, and their minds will be open, man. 

(Note: there is of course a real threat, particularly from disaffected Muslims, especially in this strange time of Muslim-baiting by the right, but for terrorism to work you have to be terrified, and Inspire is more ridiculous than anything.) 

*It is strange to me that spell-check accepts "infotainment" but rejects "derring-do".  There is a broader point here, but it mostly makes me sad as an old-timey kind of guy.

Awlaki Not to Be Extraditied From Yemen?

Foreign Minister Abu Bakq al-Qirbi seems to say so.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Abu Bakr al-Qirbi said that Yemen will not extradite the US Scholar from Yemeni origins Anwar al-Awlaqi to the United States. He affirmed that the scholar accused of links with al-Qaeda is now in the area where security forces are chasing al-Qada elements.

 This probably isn't going to go over very well, but Yemen has to play a dangerous game here- pleasing the US without alienating its own citizens, who still remember the kidnapping and trumped-up charges against Sheik Moyyad by the United States (for those who don't remember, the Sheik was arrested in Germany and brought to the US, where all accusations of helping Qaeda vanished.  He was eventually convicted of supporting Hamas, which is not a crime in Yemen.  Regardless of your feelings toward Hamas, this was bizarre and didn't present the US judicial system in a good light when it came to the GWOT.  Legally, it wasn't any different than if we sent a swat team into Ibb to capture a local qat dealer- because qat is so very, very bad).  The case against al-Awlaki is obviously a little more clean-cut, but when it comes to perception that doesn't matter.   The government handing him over to a haughty and arbitrary United States is just another way they can be painted as lackeys to America (and probably Israel, because why not?).

Sadly, I think we're in a bind.  We've trumped up this relative nobody to be the living, breathing embodiment of evil, the next Osama, a terrorist out of our nightmares, capable of riding into town wielding a sword made out of machine guns, or something.  Yemen's unwillingness to extradite will make it clear to anyone with an opinion that they are an unreliable partner playing a double game and bent on making AQAP happy. This isn't the case- whatever Salih;s opinions are about Qaeda as a whole, AQAP is his enemy. He wants to get them, I think, but can't further and needlessly provoke the citizenry just so Sean Hannity doesn't call Obama a coward.   Our breathless hype has made reconciling positions almost impossible.  When we look back on the Yemeni chapter of al-Qaeda's history I think the relentless overstatement of his importance will be the most baffling thing.  
 

Obama's Decisions

Aaron Zelin has a thoughtful article in FP's The Middle East Channel today.   In it, he essentially asks: what happens if the Obama plan to eradicate AQAP works?   Will they then again look away from Yemen and focus on something else, ignoring the structural challenges that remain?  If they do, Zelin reminds us, we'll be dealing with this again and again.  It will be like those Saw movies: endless sequels that nobody I know wants to see. 

Zelin also brings up this provocative question:

Another issue has to do with the legality of targeting an American citizen. How the Obama administration decides to handle the situation with Anwar al-Awlaki will shed light on the United States' legal policy vis-à-vis the war on terror. Will it lead the United States down a slippery slope that further erodes the rule of law and its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community? Or, will it affirm Obama's statement in his inaugural address: "we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals."

 I would quibble slightly with the wording- I think this will show if Obama wants to lead us back up that slope, since we sprinted and tumbled ass-over-tea-kettle down it the last nine years, to the point where it is hardly shocking that a citizen could be killed extra-judiciously.   There is a case for it, of course- he is at war with the US.  I'm not a legal scholar, though, and am reluctant to sound off half-cocked on this.

There has been some talk of trial, though that brings up another boatload of questions both legal and political.   The Yemeni government might be more amenable to arresting and extraditing al-Awlaki if he can get a fair trial in the US.   I don't like the "kill or ok maybe capture" strategy, especially for someone who is as low-level as al-Awlaki, but it is better than "kill at all costs".  Obama has to be willing to withstand the empurpled bloviating of ignorant senators, commentators, and other slackers for whom nothing less than a "trial" at dawn followed by a noon execution will suffice.   Long term thinking has to be the key.  Zelin's article helps to shape that framework.

Walking back (slightly) on Anwar al-Awlaki

In 2003, I came around to supporting the war in Iraq, with quite a bit of force.  Part of it was relative youth, and the misplaced thrill of being a liberal who disagrees with liberal orthodoxy.  Part of it was hatred for Saddam.  A large part of it was that I came to the conclusion- and I remember where I was when this hit me, at the apartment of the girl I was seeing at the time, boring her with my vacillations on the war- that there was just so much information out there it was impossible for the administration to mess it up.  They could take all the knowledge they wanted and apply it to not messing things up.  I don't want to sound like Tom Friedman, who says his fault was trusting the Bush administration, and thus slightly shifting blame.  It was poor analysis on my part- I misread both Iraq and America.  And yet, I was certain.

That is a pretty circuitous way of beginning this piece on Anwar al-Awlaki, someone whose supposed prominence I have blasted.  Certainty is the death of good analysis, which I what I suppose I aspire to.  It is incredible to me that people like Kristof, Peretz, and Krauthammer can still be so strident and certain about things when they were deeply and fundamentally wrong about the major FP question of the last decade. 

So I want to walk back, a little.  I do think al-Awlaki is a threat, as his knowledge of English and of America allows him to manipulate things in this country more than bin Laden.  That said, he is at most a useful tool- in the right hands he can be very dangerous.   I think as the anti-Muslim bigotry in the US gets ramped up and endorsed at high levels he will be able to strike a chord, especially among young Muslims who have are probably increasingly disillusioned about what it means to practice Islam in America (note: that is speculation on my part.  I admit to not having my finger on the pulse of the teenage Muslim community). 

But I am not going to sprint backwards.  For instance, I'm probably not going to endorse this Telegraph article from Philip Johnston, titled "Anwar al Awlaki: The New Osama Bin Laden?"  (Correct answer: no).  As a way of trying to tamp down some of the hysteria related to this dude, I will fisk in full below the jump.

Case in Point?

Fawaz Gerges has a mostly fine article about "Yemen's Summer of Discontent" (although you would have to believe that it was only this summer that AQAP's tactics shifted to "all-out war against what it called the “tyrant” Saleh government and its soldiers “who terrorize Muslims, support the crusade against our country, and are the first line of American defense in Yemen.”"  This is: not new.)   However, in that mostly fine article, he lays down this, in direct contravention to what I said yesterday.  It is like he didn't even read the blog.

In particular, Anwar Al-Awlaki—the Yemeni-American cleric the Obama administration designated in April as a legitimate target for assassination—provides AQAP members with theological, ideological and operational guidance.

This seems a pretty gross exaggeration, if not outright distortion, of what al-Awlaki does.  But this is, of course, the conventional wisdom.  I usually rebel against that, but maybe I am off my game.  So here's a question to readers or to bloggers: am I way behind the curve on al-Awlaki?   I kind of worry I underestimate his threat maybe as much as others over-estimate it.  Thoughts?

Meta-terrorism

If one man has dominated jihadi discussions this summer- at least in the popular press- it was been Anwaw al-Awlaki, the Yemeni-American demogogue who was the motivating force behind the Ft. Hood shooting, and Christmas attack, and the Times Square bombing.   He has been routinely depicted as the next bin Laden and the most dangerous man in al-Qaeda.  This has been much to my consternation and bewilderment.  In AQAP, at least until recently, he has been pretty far down the totem pole- there are many people who are better strategists and more skilled at propaganda.   This is also just opinion, but I find "inspiration" to be somewhat nebulous and emphemeral- those who can plan attacks and organize men are far more dangerous.  To be really, really crude, he is also just 1-for-3 right now in terms of success. 

Of course, no one can say that he isn't important.  He is excellent at reaching out to the disaffected, especially in Western countries.  And in this summer of anger, where Islam-bashing has far exceeded the aftermath of 9/11, when cynics and bloviating bigots dominate the conversation, there is room for another famous demagogue to speak to a different kind of rage. 

And that sort of encapsulates the man's frustrating danger- we have helped to make him a far more important player then he was before.  His fame completely outstrips his accomplishments, like any reality-show dimwit.  Putting a cross-hair on his unassuming head catapulted him up the jihadi ranks to the point where he is almost as important as we all pretended he was.  He is the Paris Hilton of jihadis- someone who shouldn't be, but is now an inescapable fact in our lives.

My take on this is that the shrewd operators who are the real masterminds behind AQAP are content to let him take credit (and possible drone strikes).  They can continue their long-term goals and step up their attacks in the shadow of someone less-accomplished.   While we have built him up, we have also let our real enemies grow more dangerous.   Our government and media have been swatting a fly while ignoring dragons.  We've created a fully post-modern terrorist. 

The Yemeni Dilemma

Oliver Holmes has a smart article on the problem Yemen faces when dealing with Anwar al-Awlaki, the Yemeni-American cleric targeted for death by the CIA.  The title, "Yemen Dithers..." is a little misleading, but then titles usually are, and generally aren't written by the author.  "Dithering" isn't the right word; it implies a unfocused lack of concern.  It is safe to say that the government of Yemen is very concerned with how to handle this. 

Of course, being concerned isn't the same as knowing what the hell to do.  Not helping with the arrest or assassination of al-Awlaki will make the US very mad, and President Salih is extremely dependent on US aid.  Helping with his death will enrage a good number of his citizens, who aren't exactly thrilled with his leadership.  Arresting al-Awlaki would probably work out, but then he'd face problems from Awlaki's powerful tribe, and even if he could deal with that it would be another set of problems.  There would be a clamor from the US to extradite him so he could face trial over here.  After all, we suspect him of aiding in the Ft. Hood massacre, and anyway don't trust the Yemeni judicial system. 

The problem is many Yemenis don't trust ours either, at least with respect to Yemenis.  Look at Gitmo; look at the trial of Sheik Moayad (kidnapped in Germany for suspected al-Qaeda and convicted in a US court for supporting Hamas, something that is perfectly legal in Yemen.  He was recently released back to Yemen).  As Holmes points out, most people in Yemen were unaware of al-Awlaki and unsure what he has done wrong, if anything.  Holmes quotes Greg's Newsweek article about how it is unsure if al-Awlaki is even in AQAP.  Turning him over in the US would also create controversy, though, to be fair, I imagine far less than a drone taking him out (this is just a guess of course, but have I steered you wrong before? No.)

So this is a perfect summation of the US/Yemeni relationship.  Things are done here that tend to ignore our partner's needs and constraints, and are done in part to satisfy domestic political requirements.   In Yemen, the President tries to balance the requests of his super-power patron with the passion of his people, while keeping a constant eye on his own power (you can reverse those clauses, if you'd like).

There is a lot of talk about the role a superpower needs to play, about how it should use its influence.  There are those who think that anything less than a full-throated military response the nearly everything is the weak and sniveling attitude of potential quislings.  Who cares what the Yemenis want?  We have some drones and a big ol' grievance: use em.   But part of being this power necessitates us downplaying our desires for balance and with an eye toward our long-term needs (in this case, a relatively stable Yemen).  If you think of that as weak, recalibrate your thoughts a touch.  Consider it a form of noblesse oblige.  Sure, I don't actually care what the coolies think about our actions, but if we have to make them happy for a few minutes to advance our interests I'll suck it up.  See, if you just think that way, you can do the right and smart thing and still satisfy your power-cravings.   

Killing al-Awlaki

Greg has an article in Newsweek regarding the limited utility, and possibly self-defeating nature, of assassinating Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.   He points out what we've discussed here- that al-Awlaki is at best small potatoes in AQAP, and that focusing on him distracts us from the real leaders.  Of course, he goes into more detail than my flat assertions.   This is the must-read of the day.

Of course, San'a is not happy about  the idea of strikes.  It is one thing for everyone to know the US is helping Yemen take out AQAP- it is another thing altogether for us to announce our plans to kill someone, specifically. San'a is trying to get al-Awlaki to turn himself in and avoid what Kissinger would call "a real international higgedly-piggedly".

Al-Awlaki's father has announced that his wayward son would stop his US-bashing if he is taken off the list.   The man is a former minister of agriculture, so he has some sway with the government as well.  In theory, this would be an ideal way to end the situation.  A little pressure causes junior to back off and get himself back to the straight-and-narrow.   Of course, as much credit as I give the Obama administration for subtle slow-plays, I wouldn't think that this was their goal.

Because here is the thing- on this blog and Waq al-Waq we've downplayed al-Awlaki to the level I feel he deserves.   But what we have right now is a pretty perfect encapsulation of the problems that the US has had in dealing with Yemen, and vice-versa.  Say the father's offer is legit (and as of now no one knows if the son is playing ball): that seems to be a perfect solution to the problem.  No blood, no more ranting, everyone walks away happy.  But you know that is impossible.  The admin backed themselves into a corner here.  Everyone "knows" this guy was behind the Ft. Hood slaughter and the Christmas attempt.   Everyone wants to see him taken out- bam: a gratifying drone-strike right between the eyes.

And so here's the mess: even if it could be proven that he isn't AQAP and really didn't have a role in either assault, there is no way that the admin can back down.  The press would go bonkers; talk-radio would have a fit; even more congressmen would be yelling seditious garbage about aiding and abetting enemies.   The father is in theory (for the sake of argument accept it as true) offering us a perfect Yemeni solution to the problem: the family guarantee.  It might not be ideal if he is indeed a criminal, but it works.  It takes a problem off our hands and allows us the chance to back down without doing anything reckless or self-defeating.  But can you imagine the US taking that offer?  Me neither.    Our domestic politics and lack of understanding- spanning both administrations- almost automatically negate the possibility of allowing a solution that appeals to Yemen.

This administration has been better and more nuanced.  But it still has the same restraints, both imposed and self-inflicted, that keep us from coming to a true resolution.