Inside Yemeni Politics

Nasser, as always, has the scoop.   Salih is trying to host a dialogue; the opposition sees it as nothing more than an attempt to circumvent inevitability and justice.

An opposition leader said Monday they refused the President Saleh’s initiative for resuming dialogue.

“We looked at it (Saleh’s initiative) as an attempt to rescue the regime not to rescue the nation,” Said Yasin Saeed Noman, the secretary general of the socialist party, the second largest opposition party after the Islamist party Islah, which leads the coalition.

And I think we are all looking forward to Glenn Beck using this as more proof of an insidious Communist/Jihadist alliance.  If anyone hears of him using Yemen as an example, don't send it to me.  I beg you not to send it to me.  I would spend 11 hours rebutting him in detail, which is a hair-tearingly futile waste of time.

Meanwhile, this paragraph could be pretty ominous.

The tribesmen were the first groups to come to the Presidential Palace. Since Saturday February 12th, 2011, President Saleh has been receiving tribal leaders from the areas around the capital Sana’a, mainly from his tribe, Hashed, the most influential tribe in Yemen.

Now, the Hashid have a lot of political weight, and through their late leader historical ties to Islah, and therefore to the JMP.  But as Greg accurately has reminded us, many times, party loyalty isn't a huge factor in Yemen.   Personal and tribal ties matter a lot more.   And the historical memory of tribesmen loyal to the leader runs marauding their way through a rebellious San'a run deep and fairly recent.   History doesn't always repeat itself, but encourages echoes, and it seems Salih is attempting to solidify himself in the ancient ways.

So...did Salih win?

Tens of thousands of people came out in San'a today to call for the ouster of President Ali Abdullah Salih, meeting, symbolically, in Tahrir Square, and- no, that's not exactly right.  They were supposed to, but the square was filled with Salih supporters, so the anti-regime rally was moved to San'a University.   According to reports, both protests dispersed peacefully in the mid-afternoon, one assumes right around the qat time, which is perfectly and wonderfully Yemeni.

I don't really mean to sound flippant; this isn't over.  The opposition plans to march every Thursday until they get what they want, which is a mix of those who wants concessions (which Salih is theoretically giving) and those who want him to step down immediately (which he isn't).  Whether these remain peaceful and relatively respectful depends on a combination of Salih's actions, and whether they at least have the appearance of sincerity, and if the JMP and other political groups can control the protests, or whether they will become a reflection of inchoate but very real dissatisfaction and rage.

(On a personal note, I got kind of giddy at writing "relatively respectful"- this is relative to what might be a new Arab world, where the speeches of leaders can be met with derisive snarls and laughter, rather than a police-enforced somnolent nod and hollow applause.  This might just be a moment, and can easily be reversed, but for now carries a whiplashing excitement.)

But for right now Salih has managed this with the kind of dexterity and stagecraft he is famous for, but which many, myself included, had thought he lost, as his circle closed and he became locked in a paranoid labyrinth largely of his own making.*   He has managed to undercut the protestors by announcing his intentions to reform the system, and coming out against hereditary rule.  The next few weeks are crucial, and we can see how sincere he really is, and that will largely guide what will happen.

What I would imagine he is going to do is find a way to share some spheres of power with the opposition, hoping he can co-opt them and they can in turn dampen the passion of their supporters.  This is what he has always done; this is his way- the Yemeni way- to smooth over differences.  And it might work.  2013 is a long way away though- for those who want change now it could seem like an eternity, and they might not listen to the JMP.  After all, if you have already broken the psychological barrier of listening to the President, who has been in charge for the entire lives of many of the protestors, it will be easy to turn on the weak and divided leaders of the opposition, especially when they can be easily accused of selling out.

So is Salih sincere?  Probably to an extent; it is in his interest not to let the country fall apart, and he has always shown an incredible ideological flexibility to fit his own interests.   Like I said yesterday, he bought himself some breathing room, and isn't really thinking about 2013 yet.  Gun to my head, I'd say he won't run again, but that is based on what is happening at this moment, and that is flexible.  If these movements collapse in on themselves, he might try to change things again.

Of course, and this should have been said all week, even if the status quo reasserts itself to some degree- and nothing will ever be completely the same; you can't erase a taste of freedom- Salih will still have all the problems he has been dealing with beforehand, and which threatened to break apart him and his country.  So, to answer the title of this post- yes.  For now, tentatively, and with a million battles ahead.



Sorry- I've been reading a lot of Borges these last couple of days.  It is impossible not to want to shoehorn "labyrinth" in somewhere.

Everything or Nothing

Sorry for the late post- we've had a HISTORIC BLIZZARD over here, as the local news has been breathlessly repeating.   But, clearly, kind of a big day in Yemen.

President Ali Abdullah Salih, leader of northern Yemen since 1978, leader of a unified Yemen since 1990, has announced that, in the face of mounting protests and a new, vibrant and explosive morning in the Middle East, he will immediately resign the Presidency.  In 2013, when his term is up, I mean.  So, not really immediately.   Salih has also announced that his son will not be the next President, and that he is scrapping new electoral laws that were considered unfair to the opposition parties, including an amendment that would allow him to run again (after 32 years, he's being term-limited out), and is delaying the Parliamentary elections in the spring to allow the opposition to better organize themselves.

So, now there are a couple of questions.  One is: is this sincere?  Is he really planning to only stay for another two years, and then take up golf?  Or is this typical Salih, where he will announce one thing but manipulate the situation for the next couple of years so that he can come back with the acclaim of the people, a reluctant hero for a troubled nation.

I won't pretend to know what is in his heart.  I would imagine that, in typical fashion, he isn't really thinking about 2013- he's thinking about right now.  These steps were absolutely crucial if he wants to hang on- I've been arguing that he needs to make huge concessions, and he made them all (all but the big one, and we'll get to that).   Salih is concerned for the day, and he thinks this will help him win it, or at least survive it.   I am sure that somewhere in the back of his head he thinks there is a way to get to 2013 and beyond, but in between there he'll have about 3700 other crisis to deal with.

But can he survive the day?  That is the big question.  As Nasser reports, this isn't going to stop the protests.

The Yemeni opposition said they would take to the streets tomorrow Thursday despite a declared promise by President Saleh that he would not stand for elections and he would not pass power to his son.

“The President Saleh’s call for dialogue is something and the demonstrations are something else,” said Mohammed Al Mutawakel, the chairman of the supreme council of the collation of the opposition parties.

“The opposition would take to the street tomorrow with the people, and the ruling party should not link the call for dialogue to the demonstrations.”

The opposition is mulling over a response to the initiatives, but I would think they are acceptable. The JMP is part of the system, after all, and they aren't going to want to upset it too much. But as I argued the other day, I don't think the JMP is really leading these marches, even though they are nominally in charge. This is a reflection of the passion in Tunisia and Egypt, and there will be a sizable number of people who will want Salih out right now- not 2013.


But I think he took some of the wind out of their sails, which of course was his intention all along. It will be much easier for him to make the case that he was elected, he has the right and the obligation to finish out his term, and that these are agitators. He gave legitimate opposition groups everything they wanted, so why are these troublemakers asking more?


Will it work? I answer this with my analyst cap, and as someone who has spent a long time thinking about it: I don't have the first goddamn clue. It is impossible to tell what is going to happen. I do think that there will be people agitating for his departure, but unless it gets really big I don't think Salih will crack down- in a strange way, he bought himself a lot of space in which he can simply ignore their demands. This might have been a masterstroke, or we might one day look back at it as the desperate moves of an end-of-his-days tyrant. I'll try to blog frequently tomorrow- should be a hell of a day, and we can just hope it doesn't resemble what we're seeing in Cairo right now.

CNAS on Yemen

At Abu Muquwama, Andrew Exum asked CNAS intern Dana Stuster for some thoughts on Yemen, with good results (he was also nice enough to mention this blog).  The whole thing is worth a read, but I am going to past a paragraph that I both agree and disagree with.

To begin with, Yemen is not on the cusp of a revolution. It’s easy to get caught up in the heady events in Tunisia and Egypt, but Yemen just does not have the socio-economic preconditions for the types of revolts seen in the past two weeks. Even if something were to take hold, the opposition movement in Yemen is incredibly fragmented. It’s unclear just what the mix of ideologies has been in the protests in Yemen these last few weeks, but even if the movement could depose Salih, there’s no clear outcome. If anything follows, it will begin with a motley assortment of groups jockeying for influence – a volatile cocktail of religious and political factions. In all likelihood, though, they won’t get that far.


I completely agree that Yemen doesn't have the same "socio-economic preconditions" of Tunisia and even Egypt- at least the positive preconditions.  It is way advanced at poverty.  And so the conclusion, that we won't have a liberal revolution is very likely.  Or, more precisely, the liberal part will only be part of the revolution. 


To me, Yemen is not on the cusp of a revolution because it is already in one- several, actually.  The Southern Movement is clearly one, and I consider both the Houthi movement and even AQAP to be revolutions as well.  I have no idea if this is outside the norm, but I haven't heard it phrased that way.  I think all three movements are essentially revolutions against the idea of a unified, centrally-controlled state. They are not tied in any real sense- see the AQAP declaration of war against the Houthis, which I really need to address in its own post, because it is pretty mind-blowing- but they have the same emotional underpinning, which is that this particular moment in political history is temporary.  As Stuster says at the end of his post, "The tribes are a constant in Yemen; the government, after a 30-some year hiatus, is about to be a lot less so."  


This is why I think the movement which has been brewing all month, and which might really explode into force on Thursday, is so interesting: it is not the same kind of rebellion.  It seems to want a state, just a decent honest one in which people are given a chance to actually live their lives without oppression or the crushing chains of poverty.   It is most similar to the Southern Movement, which is also largely secular and liberal, but it isn't trying to tear the country apart. 


This is why I think we need to be behind it.  President Salih has very few friends left, and while he might be able to stay in power, it will be even more degraded and illusory than before.  And since our biggest fear is a collapsed Yemen, it is important to throw our weight behind the one thing that might keep it from implosion.  Stuster is absolutely right that on the streets there will be a hodge-podge of movements without a center, but there does need to be a push to find one, even a symbolic one that can kind of hold things together.  I am not under the illusion that a replacement for Salih will fix everything, because in some ways he is just the frontman for a system that goes against Yemeni history.   I've said before that we do need to devolve the center, because it is an uncomfortable graft on older forms of rule.  But a new leader, even a transitional one, might be able to ease tensions with the north and the south (unless it is Brig. General Ali Mushin al-Ahmar, who is seen by all competing groups as having blood-stained hands).  


I realize this is all somewhat incoherent, but that is because the situation is so volatile and unpredictable and shifting.  Basically, I think that this movement has a chance at holding the country together, even in a very fragile way, and I don't think Salih has that ability anymore.  The chances of success are small, but the chances of success in Yemen have always been small, even non-existent.  February 3rd gives us- and more importantly, Yemenis- a crack.  


Anyway, read the whole piece I linked to.  Even if- especially if- I disagree with a few things, it is well worth the read.  


(NOTE: Edited so pronouns reflect actual gender of author.  I always guess wrong.  Sorry, Dana)

More on Protests

Nasser Arrabyee (who is also quoted in today's Times) gives the lowdown on the today's rallies, both pro-and-anti Salih.    Nasser talks about how there hasn't been much in the way of violence, with security forces showing both strength and restraint- a good sign that could be interpreted many different ways, depending on how you lean.   He also wryly points out that the two sides have chants that are almost diametrically opposed to each other- yes/no on elections, constitutional "reform", and Salih- but found a meeting point on "yes to dialogue".   So far this has: not happened.

In the comment section in the post below, our buddy Will at the Yemen Peace Project made some interesting points, so I am going to rescue them from that ghetto and yank 'em up here.  One important question he asked was, essentially, why would I think that the military would be reluctant to shoot the protestors, when they haven't shown that reluctance in the north or the south?  I meekly responded that it might be different in the capital, that at some point Salih won't be able to say the entire state is an enemy of the state.   Here is part of the response:

A sizable portion of the university population comes from elsewhere, especially Ta'iz (where there is and long has been plenty of anti-government animosity). It's quite possible that Salih can rhetorically "other" these treasonous students just as he does the Zaydi sadah (not that he invented anti-sayyid racism, but you get the idea). As you point out above, Yemen doesn't have Tunisia's educated middle class. If "Huthis"--many of whose families have been a part of the social fabric of the rural highlands for centuries--can be transformed in the state's propaganda into foreign agents, how hard could it be to turn poor, simple soldiers against uppity, westernized university brats?

I think this makes sense, but I think that regardless of who they are, there would be a psychic shock to seeing a police riot in the streets.  Not for much of the country, perhaps, but for the residents of San'a, the capital of the soul.   And I think Salih knows that.  This kind of dovetails with a point also made by Will.  "There may be hundreds rallying with Tawakul Karman, but there are hundreds of thousands minding their shops, shopping in the markets, cooking bread, driving cabs, going to school, and, of course, unemployed, who still have no interest in revolution."    

This is correct, of course.  "People power" revolutions are always exciting and heady, but they also contain only a small percentage of the people.  Maybe the represent the hopes and dreams of many more, but those many more are just minding their own business, so how can we say what is in their hearts?  It is not always accurate to say that the passion of the streets is representative, or that "the people have spoken" when a small but loud group comes in.  Being in the middle of that group, and surrounded by thousands of people who think the exact same way, is intoxicating, and you come to believe that there are only a small, entrenched few against you.   You can see this in everything from the awesome puppet-wielding Iraq-war protestors to the Constitutionally-confused Tea Party.*

And that is where police restraint comes in.  A dozen or so kids being mown down, beaten, dying in the streets, can have a way of making the rallies grow.   Truncheon-wielding riot cops right out of a Radiohead nightmare hitting students yelling slogans about elections has the possibility of turning fence-sitters one way.  I don't want to romanticize it; many will think they got what was coming to them.  But I think Salih is going to want to let this play out and hope a series of grand gestures can placate the mob, and then call the remaining protestors dead-enders.

And this is where the US can sort of come in.  Part of me wishes we could stand entirely with the students, but that can, of course, help their enemies.  I like the admin's strategy of standing with their rights, if not their goal of toppling Salih.  This puts Salih, like Mubarak, in a bind, and can help to force his hand.  He might have to give up some power and make large concessions in order to remain in the Presidential palace, or even alive.  One could see the an ambitious general thinking Salih has lost control and inducing him to leave, and while I don't think he would be killed, that possibility doesn't exactly go against the grain of Yemeni history.  So we have a possibility to help manuver Salih into letting go of some power while still being able to fight al-Qaeda, opening up in the near future the path toward an actual peaceful transfer of power (Mark Lynch thinks it will come out that the US played a behind-the-scene role in Tunisia).

I also don't want to overstate these protests- these fit the exciting new trend in the Middle East, and work nicely with the current narrative.  But what is happening in the South is still more important and explosive.  However, for the first time, some of Salih's enemies have similar rhetoric about democracy.  Linking the "three rebellions"- Houthi, Southern, and Qaeda- was a paranoid game.  These protests aren't really linked, but they aren't that far off either.   And here is a chance to institute real reforms that can also at least partially bring the restive south back into the fold, avoiding the chaos of total collapse.  This is about as likely as the Bears still winning the Super Bowl, but not impossible, either.  The next few weeks are crucial.   There is a chance for reform, for change, but a return to the status quo will be brief, and the next time it shatters will be even more violent.



*That seems like my best attempt at Broderian middle-splitting, but really, I just don't like loud people who think America is a police state.

Salih Goes All-In

I'm still muddling through President Salih's endgame in essentially announcing a bid to be President For Life (abolishing term limits).  Greg has all the specifics of the recent election moves.

Obviously, the immediate game is to remain in power.  Let's not overthink this.  But why, exactly?  And don't just say "because power is fucking awesome", even though it is.  I think that might be underthinking it.   What are Salih's goals, and how will this help accomplish them?  Those are the questions we need to ask.

I was initially writing a list of different interpretations- "Cynical" "Idealistic" "Pragmatic" etc, but found that the categories kept sliding into each other.   Salih is neither misguided but benevolent statesman nor is he a bloodlust-filled tyrannical monster.  His biggest achievement in office, what he wanted his legacy to be, was the unification of North and South Yemen.  That was a longtime dream, and in his mind, and to a large extent in truth, he accomplished it.   He absorbed a chaotic and crumbling south, and when the traitorous southern leadership maneuvered to back out, he was the one who saved the country.  Sure, he had to bring in some unsavory elements, and some eggs go broken, but that is what leaders do.  Right?

Lincoln-esque, one might say.  Not me, but someone.

So, then: unity must be preserved.  And if there is an election with his unpopular son or murderous generals against maybe Hamid al-Ahmar and a disorganized crew of Southerners, with boycotts and bombings everywhere, unity doesn't have a chance.  Elections are the end result of democracy, not the beginning.  For Salih, in his mind, he is the only one who can really win decisively- the old master of alliance-building and survival is going to give it one last go.  He is tinkering with the Constitution at the same time there have been a raft of prisoner releases, both in the north and the south.  I think Salih sees an opening to maintain his rule and settle things down over the next term, so that he can pass it on as planned.

Like I said, this is pretty muddled.  But everything is muddled, mixed up.  I've argued before that Salih sees himself as the one man who can deliver peace and unity, no matter the cost.  This is megalomania, but there is an element of sadness and even blinkered decency to it, much like Yoweri Museveni or even old Paul Kagame.   Thinking you are the only one who can hold the country together shows vast egotism, but it also can't exist without the desire to hold the country together.  And, to be fair, unless things change radically, very quickly, I do think elections will be a disaster, a hardening of schisms.

That said, I still don't know exactly what I make of this move, or what I think the US response should be.  I am getting a little tired of saying "well, we can't interfere with everything, perfect enemy of good, etc", but my weariness doesn't make it untrue.  Does anyone have any thoughts on this?

Incompetence? Complicity? Or Bad Luck?

Nasser Arrabyee has an excellent piece on the escape of many AQAP fighters from the battle of Al Huta.  He calls it the "hit and run" style of fighting.  I don't know if this is deliberately Fabian, but it might be a pattern.  This isn't the first time AQAP has been surrounded and about to be crushed by the government before slipping away (not all of AQAP, of course- they are too diffuse to be slaughtered in one battle).  So this raises three possibilities.  Probably more, actually, with many sub-possibilities, but I've already typed the word "three", and I will be damned if I backspace.

1) Incompetence.  The Yemeni army, even with US training, isn't exactly a skilled and professional fighting force.  Sure, they stopped the pipeline attack, and that was good, but even with overwhelming numbers they were unable to capture or kill a cornered and desperate force.   They are trying, but just don't have the abilities or the leadership to have anything more than sporadic and limited success.

2) Complicity.  This is the conspiracy angle.  Salih loves getting US dollars, and knows that he has to be a willing partner.  The attack, following Brennan's visit, was a great example of a dude firmly on our side in all this.  He was trying to level a great blow against his and America's mutual enemies.  But letting them slip away ensures more dollars.   It is the double game we're all familiar with- taking money but letting the problem continue, on order to keep taking money. 

3) Bad luck.  Tough terrain, hostile locals (it was in the south, where there is already seething anger at the government), a quick and slippery opponent.  At Tora Bora, bin Laden and co. managed to slip away from the greatest army the world has ever seen.  How can you blame the Yemenis for similar misfortune? 

Temperamentally, I tend to lean toward 1 or 3- human events are far more the product of chance, circumstance and lack of planning than they are the result of conspiracy or long-term duplicity.  This is especially true in Yemen, where long-term planning is often over-whelmed with the immediate needs of the day. 

Now, Salih has obviously played the double-game before, fighting some terrorists but coddling others.  As I've argued before, I don't think this is sign of bad character- it is a sign that he is the President of Yemen, not the United States.  It is childish to think that he, or any other leader, would act solely and 100% in line with the US.   That said, I think that he is concerned with beating AQAP, since they are a constant thorn in his side and are intent on bringing him down.  My take is that while Salih wouldn't mind stretching things out, and almost certainly will, he also wants to successful operations- and not just for PR.

If this pattern continues though, I might be forced to change my mind and delete this post and swear all of you to silence, under penalty of torture.  But for now I'd be interested to hear which of the above three readers think is closest to the truth, or something else I haven't thought of.

The Uses of Propaganda

I haven't talked at all about President Salih's website, which, in English, is clearly aimed at a Western audience.  It is obviously propaganda, geared toward those who might be able to give money to the country.  This is fine, of course, and something that is needed, but due to vague dismissals regarding its nature and the constraints of time, I have pretty much ignored it.

But, really, it is important, even if sometimes silly.  Its unintentional messages are just as important- if not more so- than the predictable point of view it is trying to promote (I will not get into symbolic interpretations of the main picture, in which the President is seemingly giving medicine to a child, but looks as if he is performing a spontaneous, unnecessary and malicious tooth extraction).

The message today, regarding a talk that Salih gave at the Higher Military Academy, has the headline "I want to be a soldier to serve the nation".  This, of course, is psuedo-inspiring speech-making, with its echoes of sacrifice and willingness to lay down your own identity for the good of the country.    It is uncomfortable to hear coming from the head of an increasingly martial government, but I am willing to chalk it up to the audience.   However, I'll quote at some length the meat of the article.

He accused the opposition Joint Meeting Parties of erupting problems in Saada and some districts of the southern provinces, saying that these parties announced their solidarity with the separatists who block the roads, loot stores and kill innocent people in these districts.

Regarding agreement signed with the JMP in February of 2009, president Saleh considered the deal as a big mistake made by the General People Congress Party (GPC).

It was a big mistake by the GPC, he said, the party had to go ahead alone to hold parliamentary elections with participation of these parties or not.

I am not familiar with accusations of JMP meddling in the north, but am not surprised, either.  That isn't the meat of it, though- the heart of this is the language of total opposition, of lines being drawn clearly, brightly, and irrevocably.   The JMP*, the most important and inclusive of opposition groups, is more or less officially an enemy of the state.  None of this is surprising- it has been coming- but it is still distressing.  Reconciliation, or at least an uneasy peace, grows more distant and unimaginable by the day.

It also makes laughable his statement in the speech, where he "said that if any one want power, he could have it via door not window, adding the power is available for all by elections box."   Not that anyone would have believed it, but it is red meat for a blogger to see an outright lie be immediately contradicted in the same article.

*Originally said GPC, which the opposite of reality.  Thus are the wages of blogging.  Thanks to Anon for pointing that out.